This is what Hansen asks the FTC expert after showing a chart that shows younger cohorts spend a higher percentage of time on the platform engaging with friends than older cohorts, yet they get served fewer ads — seemingly contrary to Hemphill’s claim that Meta taxes users who enjoy friend sharing more. Hemphill says the point is “apples and oranges” and that the older cohort makes up 60 to 70 percent of the user base getting higher ad loads. That prompts Hansen to ask whether he thinks Meta discriminates against such a large portion of its users, and Hemphill says it’s “a standard understanding of price discrimination.”
Antitrust
How big is too big? And when does a company become so big that the government is forced to step in and make it smaller? Politicians have been struggling with those questions for at least a hundred years. But as the latest generation of tech companies has taken shape, the questions are becoming more and more relevant to internet giants like Google and Facebook. There’s a new movement in Washington to break up those companies, whether through a Justice Department lawsuit or an old-school appeal to the Sherman Antitrust Act. It’s a struggle Microsoft fended off in the ‘90s, and it has only grown more urgent in the years since. As Amazon has taken a stranglehold of online retail, Jeff Bezos’ company has started to attract antitrust attention as well, with figures like Sen. Elizabeth Warren and Lina Khan taking aim at Amazon’s cutthroat competitive strategies. If it succeeds, it would be one of the most ambitious government projects in a generation — but success is still a long way off.
Hemphill doesn’t cite any documents or testimony that directly say Meta engages in this kind of behavior by showing these users more ads. Hansen says. Hemphill responds that his conclusion comes from the evidence of price discrimination in how Meta chooses to serve ads to different users, recognizing which are more or less engaged with their services. But, he acknowledges, “I’m not aware of a single document that connects the dots in that exact way.”
Hansen accuses Hemphill of altering the axis on charts showing user sentiment about Meta, calling it “misleading to crop the axis to magnify changes that aren’t changes.” When Hemphill describes the sentiment metrics as in “clear decline,” Hansen shoots back, “there’s no decline. It’s flat. Flat as a pancake.”
If users don’t want to see an ad, they can scroll past it in “a second or less,” Meta’s Hansen says. Hemphill agrees that “not every ad is burdensome” and users can gain value from some of them, but on the whole they are a burdensome part of the social media experience for users. Hemphill adds that he hasn’t “made a study of scroll time, though I agree that scrolling past an ad does not take long.”
Hansen charges that Hemphill’s conclusions would mean Meta would need to pay consumers to use its services in order to make it any cheaper than it already is — free. Hemphill has testified that under a more competitive social media market, there would be a greater “surplus” for consumers. Hemphill says Meta wouldn’t necessarily have to pay users in cold hard cash. Alternatively, it could offer them some other kind of reward they’d consider valuable.
Meta’s lead attorney Mark Hansen is continuing cross-examination of the FTC’s economic expert Scott Hemphill this morning. Hansen brings up this incident that Meta has repeatedly come back to at trial to show that TikTok users see Facebook and Instagram as reasonable alternatives, even though the government says they don’t compete for the same market Meta dominates. He says Facebook saw 20 percent of diverted usage from TikTok during its January 2025 outage, and Instagram, 17 percent.


During cross-examination, we’ve been looking at a 2019 deck the former Biden official, Facebook co-founder, and the FTC’s now-expert Scott Hemphill pitched to regulators, describing why they should investigate the company on antitrust grounds, based on public reporting and data. Meta attorney Mark Hansen says the FTC nor Hemphill produced the slides to them, so it’s not clear where they came from, and when they change slides, we can see they’re from a photo of a phone, where someone’s finger is visible.
Presented with a side-by-side screenshot of the three short-form video products on the same Saturday Night Live video, Hemphill takes a long pause to identify the apps before he’s saying he’s not sure which is which.
Meta’s lead attorney Mark Hansen is using cross-examination to attack Hemphill’s credibility. Hansen calls him the “very definition” of a witness with preconceived notions about Meta’s liability and brings up what a press report called a “roadshow” he embarked on in 2019 with former Biden administration official Tim Wu and Facebook co-founder Chris Hughes to encourage state and federal enforcers to look into Meta’s potentially anticompetitive behavior. Hansen charges that Hemphill hasn’t adequately disclosed this activity, which the Meta attorney characterizes as advocacy for a cause. Hemphill says he wasn’t advocating that they bring a case, but to probe and find out if a valid case existed.
After Hemphill describes how Meta’s increased rate of showing users ads is negative for consumers, Boasberg asks him to square that notion with his claim that WhatsApp and Instagram would have had to make money eventually, whether or not they were part of Meta. Hemphill says that even if both served ads to users as independent apps, it might have been to a lesser degree than they do now, or they might have offered users other benefits in exchange.
This is the message Boasberg says he’s received throughout trial, and he’s trying to square it with Hemphill’s assertion that users still want to see posts from their friends, even as they spend more and more time watching videos from people they’re not connected with. “Shouldn’t we assume that’s what they want, and therefore, what you’re terming underinvestment is just a shift that follows where users want to be?” Boasberg asks. Hemphill says Meta, not its users, determine the makeup of posts they see in their feeds, and even if friends content is declining as a percentage of the app, it’s still very large in absolute terms. And even if Meta makes less money from ads in Reels, a lot of content from people users don’t know now shows up in their feeds, too.
Boasberg pushes back on Hemphill’s framing of the Instagram acquisition as an effort to maintain a competitive moat. Hemphill references a 2012 email where Zuckerberg discussed the importance of keeping Instagram running after buying it to prevent another app from filling the vacuum. But Boasberg says this seems contrary to what actually played out: Meta invested in the app and it experienced massive growth. “This competitive moat seems a minor factor in its decision making,” he says. Hemphill says the moat was Meta’s intent at the time, even if the app ultimately exceeded expectations.
Boasberg brings up Meta CMO Alex Schultz’s testimony of “explosive growth” for Instagram and says that it would be “pretty hard” for Instagram to grow much larger than it already has in the US, since it already has most eligible US users on its platform. Hemphill says there’s other measures on which this whole slice of the social media market might have been better for consumers if Meta never bought Instagram, like consumer welfare and the quality of apps.
Meta paid a $6.5 billion to $10.9 billion premium on its acquisition of WhatsApp, depending on which valuation you look at, Hemphill says. This can’t be explained away with standard business reasons for paying more for an acquisition, like synergies that would be particularly beneficial, because he says there’s no evidence Meta analyzed this. Instead, he says, the premium “reinforces the conclusion that the project was an anticompetitive project.”
And the most likely way it would have done this without Meta would be building its own personal social networking service that competed with Facebook and Instagram, Hemphill says, since this is how messaging apps in other countries monetized. Boasberg brought up testimony we’ve heard that WhatsApp’s founders were resistant to this kind of pivot, but Hemphill says that they still had investors and employees to answer to who would eventually want a payout. Plus, he says, Meta eventually was able to convince them to monetize the app somehow.
Hemphill compares Meta’s claims that it’s power is constrained by newer apps like TikTok to Microsoft’s claims of being constrained by the PalmPilot and AOL at the time it was found to be an illegal monopolist. He says Microsoft sustained its dominance even in the face of competition “more or less on the margins.” He also says that what Meta calls “headwinds” from TikTok didn’t stop the company from beating its own revenue projection in 2024, which already forecast 78 percent growth from 2020.
Meta has argued that users’ reports about how much they think the company cares about them is mostly a reflection of media reporting, rather than actual changes to Meta’s products. Boasberg asks Hemphill whether changes in user sentiment really are about the actual products or perceptions of them, and whether that matters. Hemphill says that even in the case of Cambridge Analytica, where reporting came out long after the privacy incident at the heart of the story, “it’s not that the Facebook business in fact changed with the revelation, but what did happen was a sort of scales falling from your eyes effect, where users became aware of this possibility.” He adds that Meta pays attention to user sentiment “in a way that is not just managing their reputation.”
Meta shows fewer ads to what they call “needy users” whose engagement drops more significantly when they’re shown more ads. Hemphill calls this a “discount” for those users — and a sign of price discrimination by an illegal monopolist.
The FTC’s economic expert Scott Hemphill is back on the stand testifying about how Meta’s alleged monopoly power allows it to offer different prices to different users and across its services. For example, Meta didn’t show ads on Reels for a while, but it did show ads in other parts of the Instagram app. Hemphill compares this to what sounds like the antitrust case against Whole Foods — saying that a supermarket specializing in premium, natural foods might have high margins on its organic mangos, but low margins in areas on which it competes with many other stores, like pantry staples. He says this is similar to Meta lowering prices on the product where it competes with other apps (short-form videos) but not on the one where it dominates the market (friends and family sharing on Feed and Stories).

The government’s case could come down to whether the judge thinks MeWe is a closer competitor to Instagram than TikTok.
The judge is using Hemphill’s testimony to work through some remaining questions he has in how to think about reaching a verdict in this case. It’s too early to say what this means for his thinking, but his questions indicate that some of Meta’s arguments are at least spinning his wheels. He asks, for example, if users’ feeds are increasingly made up of posts from accounts users aren’t connected to (i.e. algorithmically-recommended influencer posts), then can time spent on the Instagram feed or stories really be used as a proxy for users’ wanting to see more posts from their friends?
Just because an alternative service can fulfill some of what a monopolist offers doesn’t make it an adequate substitute. Hemphill gives the example of Google’s search services. Sure, users can do a shopping search on Amazon or a travel search on Expedia, but these are “slivers of what it does,” Hemphill says. Boasberg’s own colleague in this courthouse found Google to be a monopolist for general search services despite this.
Boasberg posits a hypothetical: would it matter if only 10 percent of users’ time on Meta’s apps were spent on friend and family sharing — the use case the FTC says Meta monopolizes? This seems to be a key lingering question for the judge. “Does it have to encompass their core use? So, the majority of what users go to the platform for?” he adds. Hemphill acknowledges the slippery slope, but says that even at a hypothetical 10 percent of its business, that would still be “large and important and subject to monopolization, and it would still be something that we care about.”
Boasberg asks Hemphill to explain why the way users choose to spend their time when one app is down wouldn’t be relevant to show which apps are substitutes. “In fact, why isn’t that the best indicator about what is a substitute?” he adds. This is exactly the argument Meta’s made since the first day of trial: that users spending more time on Instagram after TikTok’s brief pre-ban shutdown shows users see it as a viable alternative.
Hemphill says the TikTok outage is “extremely problematic from the standpoint of trying to understand monopoly power.” First, it’s the wrong way around, and how users behaved during a Facebook outage is more useful. But even then, he says, the brief and complete outages tell us little about good market substitutes.
Hemphill uses this to show that friends and family posts, found mostly in the Feed and Stories, are still core to the app. Over a few days in April 2022, less than 1 percent of Facebook users and about 5 percent of Instagram users who watched Reels did not also spend any time in the Feed or Stories features. “The point here is that yes, users are in addition spending time on Reels, but that Feed and Stories remain fundamental to at least part of the experience of the vast majority of users.”
Judge Boasberg asks Hemphill to “square” Meta’s claim that user interest in friends and family posts are declining with Hemphill’s claim that Meta’s apps are degrading in quality because they’re showing users less of this content. Hemphill says there’s evidence users really do want to see posts from their friends and they show “frustration that they don’t get it.” So if Boasberg finds users do want this kind of content and Meta isn’t serving it, that can show it’s degraded the quality of its apps.
In a 2022 document, Meta found that Instagram was experiencing “downward pressure” from TikTok “on interest content consumption.” But, it added, “that same pressure is less evident on consumption of friend content, which begs the question: Are we putting enough focus/energy into defending/evolving key jobs we continue to be hired for?”
The FTC makes the point that because Instagram and Facebook have already added most of the roughly 250 million potential eligible users in the US, its user growth rate looks slower, even though it’s still adding users overall. But Schultz says this is exactly why Meta competes with apps like YouTube and TikTok for users to spend more time on their own apps — doubling down on Meta’s argument in the case. “Time is the thing people are all competing for because people are multi-homing, they’re using every app.”
Creating a social graph of users’ friends, likes, and interests isn’t as meaningful for social apps as it used to be, Schultz says. That’s thanks to advances in AI, which has made it easier to predict and serve content to users they might not have even known they’d like. The FTC says Meta’s network effects and extensive mapping of users’ connections makes it difficult for upstarts to dislodge it.
After a brief dip in Instagram’s growth rate in 2018 due to changes in how Facebook promoted it, the app’s growth rate recovered and continued to go up and to the right, a chart shown in court shows. Schultz says the results mean the change wasn’t as dire as Systrom might have believed.
For all the tension that came from Facebook’s decision to promote Instagram less from its app, it wasn’t all that consequential for Instagram’s growth in the end, Schultz testifies. Instagram’s growth rate dipped 14 percent, but it was still growing users overall. Ultimately, Schultz says, it was a “blip.”
Schultz acknowledges there was tension between his central growth team and Systrom in the mid-2010s, which we heard about from Systrom’s perspective a few weeks ago. While Systrom described a situation where Meta pulled back growth staff for Instagram, Schultz says Systrom was uninterested in the tweaks his team suggested to grow the app. It was only after the growth team pulled back from Instagram that Systrom realized their value and wanted them back, Schultz recalls.
The FTC is expected to wrap up its case this week, meaning Meta will then get the chance to call its own witnesses for its case-in-chief. Meta CMO Alex Schultz is back on the stand testifying about the staffing and expertise the company gave Instagram after its 2012 acquisition. He says that for the first three to four years post-deal, Meta gave Instagram co-founder Kevin Systrom pretty much “everything he wanted.”

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