Christopher Harland-Dunaway | The Verge The Verge is about technology and how it makes us feel. Founded in 2011, we offer our audience everything from breaking news to reviews to award-winning features and investigations, on our site, in video, and in podcasts. 2020-09-29T14:00:00+00:00 https://www.theverge.com/authors/christopher-harland-dunaway/rss https://platform.theverge.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2025/01/verge-rss-large_80b47e.png?w=150&h=150&crop=1 Christopher Harland-Dunaway <![CDATA[Hype man of the century]]> https://www.theverge.com/21459906/bittorrent-tron-acquisition-justin-sun-us-china 2020-09-29T10:00:00-04:00 2020-09-29T10:00:00-04:00

If Silicon Valley operated under the idea that companies should move fast and break things, then BitTorrent had become an exception. Employees enjoyed patiently tinkering with creative projects and going home at a reasonable time, free from the tyranny of startup culture. The company was founded in 2004, and though its namesake protocol helped shape the modern internet, by 2018, the company was languishing. After all, not all influential things make money.

One BitTorrent employee told me they enjoyed the slower pace of work: “It wasn’t growing like crazy or anything.” Establishing new revenue streams was difficult, and the company was starting to look like a distressed asset. And there were rumors someone was actively trying to acquire it, a sign that management’s only means of escaping stagnation was to court a wealthy buyer. 

BitTorrent had a challenging reputation. Its technology, a peer-to-peer protocol that allows large files to download quickly, was notorious because those large files tended to be pirated movies and music. Its genius came from being decentralized — spreading the burden of bandwidth, and liability, across a number of users instead of one company. The philosophy of decentralization shaped BitTorrent’s laissez-faire view of itself. It supplied a technology and had no responsibility for the pirated content illegally distributed by it.

“Get the pump on the coin”

Soon it emerged the BitTorrent acquisition rumors were true. The man buying the company was a young Chinese uber-millionaire named Justin Sun. It seemed like a fit. Sun ran a cryptocurrency company in Beijing called Tron, and like BitTorrent, crypto’s whole philosophy was built on decentralization. Some employees were excited. One told me their initial reaction was, “Oh, cool, crypto, that’s a neat space that I’ve wanted to get into.” Sun was undeterred by BitTorrent’s associations with piracy. Later, employees would discover he was more than willing to embrace it.

But right away, Sun struck some BitTorrent employees as a controversial character. For one, crypto enthusiasts noticed striking similarities between a cryptocurrency white paper Sun released and other cryptocurrency projects, including Ethereum, the world’s second-largest cryptocurrency. Twitter was abuzz with allegations that the document was plagiarized, borrowing heavily from two other papers. Juan Benet, the crypto developer behind those papers, claims that, of the 44 pages, three also contained a “basic Ethereum contract,” while nine copied exact language from Benet’s decentralized crypto projects.

One former Tron employee agreed the white paper was conceptually indistinguishable: “It was cribbed off of for sure.” Publicly, Sun defended himself, claiming the similarities came from problems with on-the-fly translation from Chinese to English. BitTorrent employees watched the controversy quietly and didn’t get any internal explanation from their new boss. 

New Tron hires would be initiated into Sun’s worldview, and within a matter of months, the company’s internal business strategy was apparently “copy Ethereum,” a former employee told me. The other was “get the pump on the coin.” The oft-repeated phrase meant doing anything to make Tron look flashy and lobby people across the world to convert their national currencies, whether they be renminbi, rupees, or dollars, into Tron’s digital cryptocurrency — thus, pumping up the value of Tron and Justin Sun himself. 

If cryptocurrency and the BitTorrent protocol were technologies built on the idea of decentralization, Tron’s acquisition of BitTorrent seemed designed to centralize power on Sun. Cribbing Ethereum’s white paper would be just the beginning in a series of ethically dubious moves by Sun: giving away Tesla cars and bidding millions on a showy power lunch; launching products that effectively rewarded piracy and products that exploited pornography. Then there was his alleged abusive conduct, which ranged from threats of violence to actual physical violence in the office.

Employees had mixed opinions when BitTorrent was acquired. None of them realized how much their steady, quiet work environment would be upended as Sun’s bravado and self-promotion steered the company into the center of the US and China’s dangerous geopolitical conflict — the trade war — all in an effort to, as Sun might say, get the pump on the coin.

Anyone following Justin Sun on social media couldn’t be faulted for thinking his reign over Tron consisted solely of insufferable, nonstop winning. In trying to separate facts from fiction in Sun’s story, and Tron’s, I spoke to former and current employees, both in China and the US, both rank-and-file and senior level, across multiple departments. In all, 18 insiders, current and former, spoke to me on the condition their names not be used out of fear of retaliation, with one exception who is on the record. Sun and Tron did not respond to repeated requests for comment.

Sun isn’t outwardly intimidating. He’s been described as a self-styled “whiz kid.” He’s 30 years old and makes sure it’s widely known that he graduated from a special business seminar run by Jack Ma, a co-founder of Alibaba and one of Asia’s top multibillionaires.  According to Sun’s autobiography, Brave New World, his meeting with Ma inspired him to become wealthy and successful. In Sun’s first Instagram post, he stands side by side with Ma, holding a graduation certificate. It makes him look like a protégé.

Sun’s first major success was an app called Peiwo, which translates to “accompany me,” an audio-based mashup of Tinder and a live-stream chat room with 10 million users. The app matched people using voice clips, but the app also had audio chat rooms where hosts flirted with soundbites that generally contained content that exceeded pillow talk. In fact, a user might drop into a chat room only to discover their host was already in the throes of orgasm. It was easy to understand why the app was successful when its content so often bordered on some kind of aural pornography. Eventually, Peiwo was booted from the Apple and Android app stores, and the Chinese authorities shut it down, along with other content that “disrupts socialist values.”

Somewhere between Sun’s constant travel back and forth from Beijing to San Francisco, he bought BitTorrent for $140 million. Part of what made the deal unique was the clash-of-superpowers atmosphere that surrounded it. According to the Pentagon, Chinese businesses have tapped into a roaring pipeline of intellectual property and funneled it back to mainland China. In the summer of 2018, some American experts were saying the US-China trade policy damaged the US economy with little benefit and evoked Cold War paranoia. After the purchase of BitTorrent, Sun suddenly straddled the conflict, with one foot in Beijing and the other in San Francisco.

Senior employees at BitTorrent were concerned the US government might scrutinize the merger. Sun was unfazed by the risks of the US-China trade war looming above. “Justin looks at barriers and thinks, ‘I can get around these barriers,’” a former senior employee told me. “In some ways that’s great. It’s kind of the entrepreneur’s mindset,” they said. But “that would include rule-breaking on the less scrupulous side of things.” Sun seemed to push those concerns aside with what became a famous phrase inside the company: “I think it’s okay.” 

After all, even Jack Ma’s Alibaba is blacklisted by the US Trade Representative for IP infringement. But BitTorrent had survived for so long precisely because the company’s senior employees and lawyers avoided gray areas. They provided a technology. They didn’t distribute pirated content. “We want to make damn sure we’re doing things legally.” 

Sun’s imagination lay in the globe-spanning Wild West of cryptocurrency. This was a place where the rules were unclear and regulations hadn’t been widely enforced. Since the rise of bitcoin, a bevy of cryptocoins have emerged, jockeying for dominance, their value often entirely speculative. Their sales pitches focus on currency that can’t be manipulated or controlled. “Decentralize the web” is an official marketing slogan Tron uses.

Sun’s acquisition came with perks. BitTorrent moved out of its old building encircled by a freeway ramp and into a skyscraper downtown at 301 Howard St. “The new office is fucking beautiful, oh my god,” a former employee said. They marveled at the panoramic of San Francisco Bay. Catered lunches became the norm. By this point, employees knew Sun only through video chat. As one former employee described, “He came off as very casual, just like young-casual. I would say no nonsense, but at this time, it was kind of in a playful way. Not in a threatening way.”

Sun finally flew to San Francisco to build his cryptocurrency empire, wearing his signature Gucci sneakers bedazzled with large pineapples over the laces every day. Tron’s “initial coin offering” of its own cryptocurrency, TRX, had gone extremely well. Sun told employees that, for one day, he was richer than Bill Gates. 

“When you see him in real life, he thinks he’s a celebrity. He doesn’t smile.” He had an assistant bring meals on a platter to his office. Multiple employees claimed that Sun’s ego was easy for sycophants to subtly exploit. One of Sun’s lieutenants at Tron would carry Sun’s bag across the office for him, deferentially walking a half step behind him. It indulged Sun’s own image of himself as famous and powerful. Among English-speaking rank-and-file, he was greeted casually, “Hi, Justin.” But a former employee who grew up in China says Chinese rank-and-file were expected to call him, “Sun Zong,” which is far more formal. “It’s like, I’m terrified of you.” As another Chinese employee put it, “When you talk to your own people, you tend to be worse,” they said. “We are more tolerant of higher pressure and expectations.” 

Sun fancied one of the conference rooms, so he seized it as his office. It was impossible to see through its frosted glass walls, but employees occasionally entered to fulfill random tasks for Sun and emerged with concerns about what they saw. They were baffled by occasional piles of cash (“stacks of hundred dollar bills!”) that sprouted on his desk, or one time, an envelope of ones (“mad stripper money!”). It was noteworthy because Sun apparently had no lock on the door. He juggled more than five phones and sometimes disappeared to China for weeks, leaving his phones, and potentially proprietary information inside them, laying on his desk. Some employees feared a shakedown if one went missing. 

“Only the Chinese government can tell you when you can take vacation.”

While Sun may have played fast and loose with his stacks of cash and phones, his expectations for employees were very different. A former employee says that Sun once began a meeting with a five- or 10-minute diatribe about how his driver accidentally locked him in his car in Beijing. Something about a child safety lock. “Who hired this person?” Sun demanded. The peak of his entitled behavior, according to a former employee, was when he fired his personal assistant because she booked a doctor’s appointment and sent him along in an Uber. Sun was furious. Sun expected the doctor to come see him. HR explained to the assistant that she didn’t know how to serve rich people. 

“Why did he behave like a spoiled brat?” a former employee wondered, “He reads as someone who ended up with a lot of money and had no idea how to use it.” A former senior employee thought that Sun imagined himself as coming from “the kind of elite in China, where there’s these men who think like, ‘I’m destined for greatness.’”

Employees had questions about where Tron was headed and submitted anonymous questions for BitTorrent’s traditional Q&A with the company’s senior leadership. Hours before the Q&A, Sun called together his marketing team “to send him the list of questions,” so he could censor questions he didn’t like, says a former employee officially briefed on the meeting. Sun started reading existential questions about Tron’s future, such as, “What if TRX [Tron’s crypto] drops to zero?” Sun’s mood soured instantly. “He took it extremely personally.” According to the employee, he began yelling and threw a tantrum. “Whoever asked this question, we’re going to track them down,” Sun seethed, before threatening “to kill their entire family.”

The Q&A took place well after work via Zoom. The office’s central conference room filled with about 10 employees at a long table flanked by frosted glass walls. Sun and Tron leadership in Beijing joined remotely. A senior Beijing employee answered questions, and employees’ concern over the survival of the company bubbled up again. The Beijing employee dished out a tongue-lashing, “essentially saying none of you should question Justin. He knows what he’s doing, he’s gotten this far, how dare you question the ability of Justin? It’s disrespectful, it’s spoiled to ask this.” Employees exchanged looks with each other and dug in, defensive about their unlimited vacation policy. The reply: “Nobody can tell you when you can take vacation. Only the Chinese government can tell you when you can take vacation,” a former employee recalled. “That’s when the culture shift started coming in.”

“What if TRX drops to zero?” stabbed at the heart of every cryptocurrency’s dilemma. It derives its value from people actually using it, which is why Sun evangelizes Tron. As one former employee told me, “I would say he’s the hype man of the century.”

It’s an odd accolade. On one hand, it’s a compliment. On the other, it’s a warning.

Because he was born in a poor, rural province of China, Qinghai, Justin Sun always felt he needed to prove himself. “From the very beginning he had this dream to do something that was apparently impossible,” a former employee told me. Sun’s autobiography says his mother was an unrelenting “tiger mom,” and his dad was a penny-pincher who hated throwing away old belongings. As a child, Sun left home to study the ancient game Go in Wuhan. Other articles say that while he was away at Go school, his parents divorced, but he didn’t know until he arrived home. 

He overcame his disadvantages with cleverness and focus. “He’s a machine. He can work 20 hours a day.” Sun started to believe he should impose his work ethic across his company.

Sun flooded the San Francisco office with articles from the Beijing PR shop. “A lot of them were about Justin Sun and how he is a genius and how talented he is and his leadership. Really just singing the praises of Justin Sun,” a former employee said. “It was really disgusting.” 

Other articles came through the transom, all about a new company work culture: “9-9-6.” As one former employee who grew up in China explained, “Basically, a lot of internet companies in China work this 9-9-6 schedule from 9 AM to 9 PM, six days a week.” 

The first article that caught everyone’s attention featured Sun’s hero, Jack Ma. In the article, Ma demanded employees be grateful they have a 9-9-6 job, that people envied them. “I shared the article and people were really confused in the US office,” a former employee told me. “Like, what is he implying? Is he trying to say that we should start this 9-9-6 bullshit?” Some of the Tron employees in San Francisco witnessed 9-9-6 culture in the Beijing office. During one 5AM call, Beijing time, SF employees were surprised by the appearance of the lead engineer on the call. “He turned on the video and he looked like he just rolled out of bed or something. He said, ‘I slept in the office tonight,’” a former employee recalled. “I really feel for them.”

“Okay so we’re doing threats now?”

“Americans by contrast, they’re lazier, but they’re more creative,” a former senior employee recalled Sun explaining. “So he’d kind of give the grunt work to the Chinese team,” they said, “the engineers, the developers, no question, they’re working 9-9-6.” There was an irony in Beijing, though. While the engineers were indentured to the 9-9-6 credo, coding at all hours, everyone else at the Beijing office ignored it. So long as they maintained “the illusion.” Sun, after all, was in San Francisco.

HR mandated that employees replace Slack with a Chinese equivalent called DingTalk. It came with added surveillance features that went as far as using Apple Health to count people’s steps and pinged users at all hours. “DingTalk is spyware,” said one former employee. Another employee asked HR what might happen if they refused to install it. HR replied that a list of noncompliant employees was being compiled and sent directly to Sun. The former employee harkened back to the moment. “Okay so we’re doing threats now?”

Employees had difficulty gauging what changes in Tron’s work environment were attributable to Chinese tech work culture, where management generally exercises far more control, or whether these changes were specific to Sun’s leadership. A couple of former employees told me about their past experiences working in Beijing. They saw aspects of China’s corporate culture in Sun, but thought he was actually an outlier, “one of a kind.” 

Sun had more in common with another powerful American, which earned him the moniker “The Chinese Trump.” On at least one occasion, Sun fawned over Donald Trump’s marketing at a meeting. A former employee also believed both had an affinity for dictatorial power. Sun only selects “yes men” for his inner circle, former employees explained, so they stake their future on him. One compared Sun’s apparent insistence on loyalty to Trump’s control over the Republican Party, except Sun is “many levels better than that.” 

Despite Sun’s evangelism for a “decentralized” internet where ideas compete and the best one wins, he and his tight clique of lieutenants dictated terms to his workforce. His penchant for control also bled into Tron’s business dealings.

A former employee says when Tron was pilloried on a popular Reddit thread, Tron paid the moderator, “perogies,” to allow the company to erase negative posts. A former employee said perogies was actually “a hardcore-fucking-Redditor to the bone, all about free speech.” Free speech is part of the ideology of decentralization, where ideas flow without gatekeepers. Tron started deleting any post it wanted. Bristling, perogies threatened to reveal his payments publicly. The Beijing office took over, the former employee said, “and he disappeared into the fucking night, never heard from him again.”

“Wow, this is actually illegal.”

Even though Sun went to extremes to control Tron’s public image, his own app store, called the Tron Network, was a free-for-all. Users purchased some apps with Tron’s cryptocurrency, and the company sometimes took a sliver of the app’s revenue. The most successful were gambling apps, employees told me, and Tron preferred to “squash” any app by imitating it. Sun eventually built an office in Shenzhen, China, where programmers worked on copycats. Meanwhile, questionable developers gathered on the Tron Network like ants to sugar. “We didn’t know who they were. We had zero way of contacting them. So these people would get on our blockchain and scam. Scam all day, 24/7. It never ended,” a former employee said. Complaints streamed in, like, “Hey, I just lost my life savings!” A former employee recalled Sun and the senior Beijing employees ignoring the scam warnings during weekly meetings and sometimes mocking English-only employees’ ideas in Mandarin, before telling the interpreter, “Don’t translate that.”

Scammed users tried to fight back. Letters from the Better Business Bureau arrived in Tron’s San Francisco office one month. “They were coming in quite frequently,” said a former employee, “like, piles building up.”

Even though Tron succeeded in deflecting scam victims and criticism on Reddit, the company was about to suffer a very public self-inflicted wound.

As a promotional stunt, Sun raffled off a Tesla. Sun tweeted a pre-recorded video of the drawing, but people noticed a flash on the screen, which, slowed down, showed an image of the winner’s Twitter profile before the announcement. Crypto watchers thought it was a sham. Sun blamed Twitter’s video compression, calling it a “glitch.” 

“Somebody fucked up and the graphic came on the screen before [Sun] read the winner,” a former employee says, “which to any Internet conspiracy theorist is like, ‘This is bullshit, they literally came on the screen before he picked it!’” It was a real contest, employees insisted. But the online furor was too much, and Sun retracted the Tesla. Sun did a new drawing, with a new winner, but the controversy continued. So he gave away two Teslas, one for each winner.

Sun’s leadership style caused the “fuck-up,” a former employee believed. “Justin doesn’t care about how to actually run a business,” they said. “He just cares about making loud noises and getting results.” When employees reviewed the Tesla sweepstakes in a meeting later, they realized, “Wow, this is actually illegal.”

The Tesla debacle was important, internally, for another reason. “That’s probably his biggest meltdown,” a former employee said. Multiple former employees could hear Sun screaming at people in his office, his shouts echoing down the hall. Sometimes he leapt out of his office, slammed the door, and unleashed a rageful howl at no one in particular. His assistant sitting outside his office didn’t budge. Employees talked about times when they could hear him kick his door while eviscerating workers in his office or over the phone. Everyone dreaded meetings. From then on, “there were always rumors that he wanted to fire a bunch of people.”

After the disaster, a Tron employee ran into a top communication manager for Justin Sun’s hero, Jack Ma, at a function in the Bay Area. “As soon as I mentioned Tron and Justin Sun, she said, ‘Please tell him that we don’t want to have anything to do with him.’”

Nearly everyone I talked to said the cornerstone of Sun’s business wasn’t necessarily technology, but using marketing to extract money from users. In a meeting, Sun once compared the marketing team’s objectives to the business of a “whorehouse.” With the failure of the Tesla stunt, the answer, to Sun, was to pursue a bigger, even flashier stunt: be the highest bidders at a charity auction for lunch with Warren Buffett. 

“He thrived on just doing anything for attention and clout,” a former employee says. “Clout-chasing, as the kids call it.” 

Sun won the auction, costing him $4.57 million — roughly the value of 130 Teslas. When the marketing department asked Sun how high he was willing to bid, Sun replied, “I don’t care, I want to win it regardless.” There was no cap. “It’s hard to get him to pay a bill but it’s easy to get him to spend money.”

The media hype was considerable. But as a CNBC interviewer pointed out to Sun, Buffett had “compared Bitcoin to gambling in Las Vegas” and said cryptocurrency was “rat poison squared.” Sun gamely laughed and insisted that one of the world’s most successful investors didn’t have the right sources of information.

Not long after, President Trump tweeted that he’s “not a fan of Bitcoin and other Cryptocurrencies,” whose value is based “on thin air.”

“Mr. President, you are misled by fake news,” began Sun’s reply, “Bitcoin & Blockchain happens to be best chance for the US! I’d love to invite you to have lunch with crypto leaders along with @WarrenBuffett on July 25.” Sun invited Trump to lunch.

A week later, Tron’s Twitter account announced the lunch was postponed because Sun had kidney stones. The next day, Chinese newspapers published stories that Sun was not only suspected of illegal fundraising, gambling, and money laundering, but supposedly detained by Chinese authorities in Beijing.

That afternoon, Sun’s Periscope account went live. He appeared in his white-walled San Francisco apartment, the Bay Bridge over his shoulder. He riffed about Tron’s business plans, before saying, “I’m completely fine.” 

“It’s like a whole company full of people standing there being lied to.”

Employees told me what actually transpired. The Chinese authorities had been calling Sun for weeks, “essentially saying, you can’t have this lunch,” a former employee says, because Buffett was a “capitalist pig symbol.” Things boiled over when Sun invited Trump. It was apparently intolerable for a Chinese citizen to lunch with the US president during the trade war. The Chinese government kept calling Sun, “and he had been essentially ignoring them,” a former employee says.

The authorities targeted Tron. In Beijing, “they raided the office and took six top employees.” They even found Sun’s estranged father in whichever province he was living and detained him, too. Their phones were confiscated, and they were told Justin Sun was under investigation for corruption. One of the detained employees was so scared she began crying. Six hours later, the authorities returned and said, “Here’s your phones back if somebody wanted to call Justin and mention that maybe you shouldn’t have this lunch with Trump.” Their final message: “You can’t mention this to the press.”

Sun finally told his inner circle what happened. “He was sort of laughing and he said, ‘Oh you know, one of the women was crying,’” a former employee said. “I thought, I’d be fucking scared. I would have shit my pants if the Chinese government comes in.” Yet, Sun was chuckling about it. “That’s just so callous.”

Tron convened an emergency “war council,” and they allegedly advised him to concoct a medical excuse to get out of lunch with Buffett. Kidney stones were the result. The stories emerging in the Chinese press were also false. “China decided they were going to get even with him in the state newspaper,” a former employee recalled, “basically saying that he was a crook.”

Sun gathered the company for an all-hands. He sauntered in, laughing. “Now I understand why they say fake news, right?” he said, assuring the workforce the stories were untrue. “My jaw just hit the floor,” an employee said. Only hours before, they were told Sun had kidney stones, yet here he was, in perfectly good health. “It’s like a whole company full of people standing there being lied to.”

The lunch was postponed indefinitely. A day later, Sun made a long and strange post to his millions of followers on Weibo, the Chinese equivalent to Twitter. “I didn’t sleep all night yesterday, and deeply reflected on my memories and was introspective of my behavior and words — I felt ashamed for my over-marketing,” he said, according to a translation. Sun called Chinese regulators “elders” to whom he would “open my heart” and heralded “the rapid development of socialism with Chinese characteristics in our country’s new era.” He closed with a promise: “I will repair my shortcomings, reduce my vocalizations on Weibo, shut the door and decline visitors, reduce the media interviews” in the name of “national interests.” 

It was the most uncharacteristic apology Justin Sun had ever posted. He deleted it shortly after.

While Sun suffered publicly, workplace standards deteriorated: “Everything went toxic real fast.” There were plenty of reasons for co-workers to confide in one another, but instead, an incongruous silence settled in, and events within Tron stayed remarkably well-hidden.

During one of those days, a new Tron software engineer fresh out of San José State University, Lukasz Juraszek, arrived at work early, unaware of a shocking incident he was about to witness. Juraszek grew up in Poland and flew to the US to work as an au pair. He met his future wife on the flight over, and the precocious children he babysat helped him learn English. He piled up debt pursuing a bachelor’s degree in computer software engineering. His new job at Tron was crucial to both his career ambitions and complying with US visa requirements. Juraszek was sitting at his desk that early morning at Tron, when Sun rushed out of his office nearby and accosted someone out of sight behind Juraszek’s low cubicle wall. The argument escalated. Juraszek peeked over his workstation divider across the office and saw Sun and the head of engineering, Cong Li, standing a stone’s throw away outside a conference room. 

“At one point they both looked at me,” Juraszek told me, and he ducked down. 

When Li joined the company, he was a soft-spoken, diplomatic technical lead with an infectious smile. He scaled the company ranks because “he got Justin to trust him,” a former employee said. But there was another more Darwinian reason Li succeeded. He was one of the few willing to tolerate Sun’s constant demands and in his case, threats. Once, on a call with multiple other employees, Sun half-jokingly, half-seriously, threatened to fire Li if he didn’t do what he said. It seemed to stick with Li. 

Juraszek sat listening to Sun yell at Li, struggling to focus on his work. “Your hands are shaking, you have cold sweats,” he said. “Then I heard spitting.”

Li screamed. Juraszek stood and looked over the cubicle wall and saw Li recoiled, holding his hand on his arm. Sun had just pummeled him.

Nearly every worker I spoke to recalled only hearing a fuzzy rumor about it. But it wasn’t some strange unreality. Li later confirmed to another employee, “Justin hit me.” The violence seemed to change Li and the office. 

Tron refocused on a project called BT Movie. Sun pressured Li to release it as soon as possible and micromanaged him, wearing Li thin, taking his time away with his two little daughters, sometimes calling him at four in the morning with inane requests. BT Movie was a decentralized app designed to distribute videos and movies. Uploaders were rewarded with cryptocurrency. But one employee worried the design might actually encourage the distribution of pirated movies or be “gamed by hackers” who would defraud the company. The employee also said BT Movie might alarm US regulators because other illegal content might pass through Tron’s servers, like child porn.

Oddly, according to Juraszek, BT Movie discussions were kept off the record or informally messaged about on DingTalk.

Juraszek’s supervisor, a Chinese employee named Zhimin He, was just as concerned about BT Movie. One day, Juraszek was at his desk, when he heard an argument erupt in a nearby conference room that was so loud it cut through the electronic dance music Juraszek was listening to on his Bose noise-canceling headphones. He could see two feet where the conference room’s frosted glass ended, near the floor. It was Cong Li and Zhimin He. There was a loud crack of a laptop spiked on the table inside. Then, Juraszek heard a sound “like a punch, slap, or a strike of a hand.” Li barged out of the conference room, flinging the door wide. Juraszek saw Zhimin He, “apparently extremely disturbed and in an awkward sitting position, leaning back.”

Juraszek turned to his teammates, “This is crazy what’s happening at this company. It goes on and on.” He walked to HR, hands shaking the whole way. He felt that he was crossing a threshold, putting his job at risk, and thus, his US visa. “It’s hard to explain to a non-immigrant, but that’s something that’s in the back of your head always,” he said. “If I don’t find a job within a month, I’m going to be deported.” After he detailed what happened, the HR specialist told Juraszek that if there was any retaliation, “Please let me know.” 

Shortly after, HR introduced a course on workplace harassment.

When employees pressed Cong Li with concerns about the legality of BT Movie, he told them they “should not worry about it.” After all, “we just did the engineering.” It matched Sun’s mantra: “I think it’s okay.” 

Juraszek understood this as a plea of ignorance. At that point, the software supposedly wasn’t operational, but Juraszek was suspicious. He went and booted up BT Movie to inspect. It was already live, and what he saw shocked him. There was a long list of Hollywood movies available for download, starting with The Lion King, which had only been in theaters for a couple of weeks, followed by Once Upon a Time in Hollywood, Godzilla: King of the Monsters, Hobbs & Shaw, John Wick: Chapter 3, Avengers: Infinity War, Ant-Man and the Wasp, Black Panther, and others. 

“Absolute betrayal”

Juraszek later learned HR inaccurately reworded his complaint about Li, so he corrected them in writing, only to be warned that, according to the employee handbook, he was “disrupting the workplace.” “My stomach sunk,” he said. “It was a confrontation of my values, my principles, what I want to accomplish.” He understood HR to be saying, “You little dude. What are you doing? That’s not your place. Just shut up and do your job.” Juraszek threw the employee handbook right back at HR, listing the litany of incidents that broke company rules. An hour later, the HR email correspondence disappeared. “As if I had never sent it.” That afternoon, Juraszek’s computer stopped working. He was told there were “server maintenance issues.” Puzzled, Juraszek poked around and discovered other people had accessed his Tron email. More emails went missing. 

Juraszek felt the walls closing in. He opened DingTalk, the office communication app employees feared was spyware, to screenshot evidence. He surfed to the BT Movie discussions and saw a long list of “Message deleted. Message deleted. Message deleted.” Juraszek rushed to the project manager, Tom Mao, and told him that messages were vanishing on DingTalk, and they needed to preserve evidence. Mao agreed but seemed twitchy. After they finished talking, Juraszek peered over at Mao’s screen and says he saw him deleting messages on their back-up Slack thread. “Absolute betrayal,” Juraszek said. (Mao did not reply to a request for comment.)

On the train home that evening, Juraszek filled out an IC3 complaint and sent it to the cybercrime division at the FBI.

Inspired by whistleblower Edward Snowden, Juraszek tried to filter out his emotions and build a methodical process for collecting evidence before he ran out of time. “There’s no real sleep,” Juraszek said. Several days later, Cong Li, HR, and Tron’s lawyer pulled Juraszek into a meeting. They accused Juraszek of “sharing company information with [at least one] third party.” He was fired.

When I interviewed Juraszek, he wore a Tron T-shirt. On his computer, he showed me the source code for BT Movie, which is publicly accessible. The code shows that, as a rule, Tron takes 20 percent of all tips that users send to each other in BT Movie. The coding for the app also uses version control, which logs every single change to the code and who made it. Every person who makes a change has an identifier — a random string of letters and numbers. But they’re not random to Juraszek. He has a list of the unique identifiers that belong to the Tron employees who worked on BT Movie. He showed me that Tron employees uploaded torrents that would direct users to servers where pirated Hollywood movies lived. Then, Juraszek highlighted a bit of code that showed Tron drew the remaining 80 percent of the tips for every movie they uploaded. But were the pirated movies sitting on Tron servers? Impossible to know, Juraszek said. 

Tron had waded directly into one of the United States’ central grievances in the trade war: intellectual property theft. “It’s an unreal situation,” Juraszek told me, thinking back to his last days and hours at Tron. “It’s a melding of fiction and reality.” 

The FBI never replied to Juraszek’s complaint.

In March, Cong Li resigned. In some ways, Sun had treated his right-hand lieutenant far worse than Juraszek, the whistleblower. 

Sun never discovered the most important reason why Li was so pliant to his every whim: Li, like Juraszek, was in the US on a work visa. A former employee said Li tried to keep his visa status carefully hidden from Sun. If Li had been fired, his family might have been forced to leave the US.

If BT Movie was a liability, it was nothing compared to BT Live. It troubled multiple former employees, and Sun apparently wanted the true scope of the project kept secret.

On the surface, it was just a live-stream app. In fact, BitTorrent’s brainy founder, Bram Cohen, originally coded the bare bones. “It got canned and set aside, so it had to be revived.” But it was a “bizarre” situation where the engineers didn’t really know what they were building. Sun demanded “a very, very aggressive schedule.” Employees thought the project was “cool,” but the market was saturated with live-stream apps like FaceTime, Facebook Live, and Skype. A confused former employee wondered, “What’s the selling point?” It’s not hard to stream video to people on their phones,” another employee said. Then, management added a familiar objective: decentralize it. “And so you say that word and say, ‘Alright, now this is a really interesting problem.’” The idea was to use the BitTorrent protocol to support the live streams. There would be no central system controlling and forwarding the live streams. “And I’m thinking, man, it’d be great if during the Arab Spring this app existed because Syria was turning off the internet and stuff like that,” a former employee says. “So that’s how we got kind of amped for it.” 

It looked like maybe Sun was pursuing software that dissidents all over the world could only dream of. He attended most meetings and called the shots. Employees had never seen this before. “He gave us a directive, and it’s basically like, ‘Go copy BIGO Live,’” a former employee said, before adding a caveat, “I can’t say that’s a direct quote because almost all the meetings that I was in with him, he did not speak English. And there’s a translator involved.” 

BIGO Live is a Chinese live-streaming app with chat rooms that users watch. The viewers pay streamers with tips. BIGO Live had used India as a beachhead to get outside the Chinese market. So Tron put Richard Hall, a brash British expat and Silicon Valley veteran, on a plane to India to research BIGO Live.

Employees at the time say Hall was initially excited by his findings. He surveyed streamers and discovered BIGO Live ran a sloppy operation in India that would be easy for Tron to beat. Live-streamers earned little to nothing. Since Tron needed streamers to jump-start their audience, Hall’s idea was to pay them “straight up rupees,” a former employee says. “We just give them, you know, a fair amount of money for their time. We’ll easily convert them over to using BT Live.” 

“This will not end well for you.”

Then, Hall began interviewing BIGO Live streamers. Typically, they were Indian college girls looking for a side hustle. He learned they endured a daily torrent of lewd remarks. The worst offenders seemed to be wealthy oil emirs from the Gulf. A handful of BIGO Live streamers talked to me on the condition their names be withheld. They confirmed they were barraged with sexual harassment and the platform’s moderation was lacking. One streamer remembered her colleague’s headshot was photoshopped onto a naked body and circulated by a repeat offender. A shaken Hall returned to San Francisco with a simple message: “We cannot not have moderation. We must have moderation.”

Hall kept pushing for moderation for several Tron projects. Later, when Hall was preparing for a $10,000 vacation cruise with his family to celebrate his 50th birthday and 20th wedding anniversary, Tron pressured him to cancel it, despite it having been approved months in advance. When Hall started sharing memos of his conversations with management, he was told, “this will not end well for you.” Ultimately, Hall was called to a meeting and fired because he was “not a fit.” He walked to a co-worker’s apartment, had a whiskey, and vowed to sue. (Richard Hall declined to comment for this story.)

Sun wasn’t concerned about Hall’s discoveries in India. But former employees say BitTorrent’s CEO at the time, Jordy Berson, who was deeply involved in BT Live, made a commitment: “We will not do it unless there’s moderation.” Besides, the cost of an officeful of moderators in India was negligible. And at least in theory, BT Live wouldn’t survive a single day in the Apple or Android app stores without moderation.

Sun was furious with the team’s objections. “He basically wanted to replace the entire team with the China team. He just had it. He had it with us.” San Francisco employees tried commiserating with the head of BT Live’s engineering and product team in China, whose name is Garlic. Garlic called Sun, “Laoban” or “Boss” in Mandarin, and said, “At the end of the day Boss will just do what Boss wants and you just gotta do what he says.” They doubted Garlic would resist Sun’s worst instincts. As Sun pushed forward, no one knew that someone in the San Francisco team discovered his well-kept plans for BT Live.

I was told about a product designer on the BT Live team named Oscar Ko. He was an American BitTorrent employee and a churchgoer who washed the feet of San Francisco’s homeless some weekends. And he had a secret skill. 

“He explicitly wanted Pandora’s box!”

“He speaks Mandarin,” a former employee says, “And I didn’t know that. And neither did anybody else on my team.” One day, Ko suddenly quit. A confused former employee asked what happened. “Talk to me offline,” Ko said. At their rendezvous, Ko told a story. Sun walked into the conference room in San Francisco during a meeting one day and explained offhand in Mandarin what his vision for BT Live was, then stood up and left. Ko understood everything. “Justin Sun wants this to be a porn app so it can get around the Chinese censorship laws and Great Firewall.”

The key was exploiting the BitTorrent protocol. “Because the nature of [peer-to-peer decentralized sharing] it’s extremely hard to track down and shut down when something gets started and gets seeded and gets transmitted,” a former employee explained. “Best case scenario, people can talk about freedom, democracy, Tiananmen Square, and political reforms and all that stuff.” But it was a Pandora’s box, they explained. Anything could be live-streamed — child abuse imagery, terrorist content. “Even worse, you can have people livestreaming themselves murdering people. And the government and authorities wouldn’t have a way to shut it down.”

Now, the team knew and confronted Sun. But his response shocked them. “He explicitly wanted Pandora’s box! To him, because in China, in their environment where everything is restricted, where everything is so tightly controlled, he imagined if he can open this Pandora’s box and then the government can’t shut it down. He would have an exclusive stranglehold on the market in a place where anything goes. Anything that people used to not be able to see, to do, to broadcast… Now, anyone can do that, at any point, and it’s unstoppable.” 

And everyone would use Tron’s cryptocurrency to buy in.

The BT Live team pulled the brake lever, hard. At a meeting, they demanded Sun moderate the app. Sun walked to a whiteboard with an idea. He drew a square. Then he drew a line through the middle, it looked like the front page of a newspaper. Everything above the line, or “above the fold,” was the landing page users would see when they accessed BT Live. All completely moderated. Then, Sun pointed to the bottom half of the square. “Below the fold” is where all the unmoderated content would go. All users needed to do was scroll down. 

Employees in the meeting were appalled. The team even developed a $9,000 moderation toolset that could be automated. Sun barely acknowledged it. When the team leaders briefed their engineers on Sun’s moderation ploy, one engineer slammed their laptop closed and “rage quit” the meeting.

“In my opinion, Justin Sun is an evil genius. Nothing can stop him.”

Shortly after, the team demoed the app for Sun. “It’s very clear Justin doesn’t care at all. He’s totally checked out. He’s not paying attention,” a former employee believed. Nevertheless, Berson, BitTorrent’s CEO, sent an email praising the BT Live team for their hard work. He announced his resignation the next day. “He was 100 percent fired,” a former employee says. Sun transferred the project to the Chinese office, where employees suspect it could be completed later. “In my opinion, Justin Sun is an evil genius,” a former employee said. “Nothing can stop him.”

Months later, Lucasz Juraszek and Richard Hall filed a lawsuit against Justin Sun: civil charges ranging from fraud to harassment to whistleblower retaliation. They demanded a public trial. Sun’s lawyers requested arbitration. The judge sided with Sun, meaning details from the case may never be public.

Juraszek and Hall’s lawyers sent the lawsuit’s 52-page complaint to a US attorney at the Department of Justice in San Francisco, but they never heard back.

Decentralization, as a principle, carries the irresistible promise that pervaded the early days of the internet, when it was less regulated and wasn’t saturated with surveillance. It was free in a way that still makes the era feel like a halcyon touchstone. Perhaps decentralization truly could achieve that kind of internet. But it’s extremely difficult to believe that Justin Sun is seriously aiming for such a lofty goal. His business ideas don’t aim to enhance decentralization but merely to exploit the idea for profit, regardless of the harm it could cause. What decentralization has offered Sun is a plausible ideology under which he can continue to avoid accountability.

“There’s no bottom to how low he’s willing to go to achieve his goals,” a former employee said. “He doesn’t care about anybody. He doesn’t care about anything.” Wrung out and exhausted for standing up for their beliefs, a procession of employees quit or were fired. The final tragedy being that Sun took idealists and made unbelievers out of them. “I believe in the technology. I believe the technology has purposes,” one said, before thinking about the real-life consequences of how Sun wanted to implement it: “This is not something he would ever even consider.” 

“I have to see the human cost of all this.”

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Christopher Harland-Dunaway <![CDATA[Outside the wire]]> https://www.theverge.com/2019/11/19/20961811/taliban-afghanistan-radio-in-a-box-djs-news-war-us-army 2019-11-19T09:00:00-05:00 2019-11-19T09:00:00-05:00

I.

On any given day in 2012, Wafa was one of the rare Afghans who was allowed inside Combat Outpost “Little Blue.” It was a US military camp in an open, arid pan in Shah Wali Kot, Afghanistan. The outpost was surrounded by a mix of Hesco bins filled with earth and concrete blast walls topped with razor wire, sitting in the south of the country, Kandahar Province. There were tents, camouflage netting, and a gravel lot where helicopters beat down from above, scattering a gyre of silt into the air. Moondust, the American soldiers called it. But inside one of the only solid buildings on the outpost, in the relative hush of a plywood shed, Wafa sifted through CDs. He was a digital disc jockey, picking out Pashto pop songs to play on his radio show. A US soldier had given him a hard drive filled with American classic rock. Wafa put on a heavily Auto-Tuned Pashto ballad and twirled his finger in the air to the chugging beat, absorbed in the music. This was a potentially lethal act.

A fellow Afghan DJ named Jan grew up in the same province as Wafa, which was the site of a widely known cautionary story about a taxi driver. It took place when US commandos and ground troops had only begun to trickle into Afghanistan. The cabbie stopped to pick up riders, but Taliban on the roadside heard music playing inside his car. They took a chain to his head and beat him until he was dead. A product of the Taliban dictum: “Those who listen to music and songs in this world, on the Day of Judgment, molten lead will be poured into their ears.”

PIRATE RADIO

Once you remove the idea of pirate radio from its mythology, you realize that it exists largely for people who live in the margins. This special series of features and podcasts explores a complicated narrative of what illegal transmissions can do and who they reach.

But Jan also remembered the first sign that the Americans had actually secured his home province at the end of 2002, nearly two decades ago. He was inside his home and heard music on the radio, a signal that the Taliban was gone. Outside, young people fired Kalashnikovs into the air to celebrate. “I wish I could have an AK-47 at that time, so I could shoot it too,” Jan says. He was only 14 years old at the time. By the time Jan and Wafa were DJs, they were in their 20s. Both of them spoke to The Verge on the condition that they are only referred to by their nicknames in order to protect their own and their family’s safety.

At Wafa’s right hand in the studio, sitting on a plastic-looking American flag tablecloth, was a black box. It was three shoeboxes high, with nobs, buttons, and digital readings. The top half was a commercially available Denon DN-X500 pro DJ mixer; below was a cool-gray box with blue trim. The radio transmitter was inside. The first time they fired it up, they were unsure if it worked. They flipped it on, and Jan grabbed the mic and said, “This is Kerwan FM and we are broadcasting from Gardez, Paktia.” He announced a phone number listeners could call. “If anyone hears us, please call.” The phone lines were immediately slammed with more than 500 calls. 

“We were so happy,” Jan recalls. “The radio was very simple. It was just in a box. But it was very powerful.” 

With an antenna and the watts cranked up, it could travel hundreds of miles. It turned Wafa’s glorified shed into a radio station and turned hundreds of Afghans working for the US military into DJ warriors. The program was unassumingly called “Radio in a Box.”

While Wafa worked the airwaves, American forces patrolled Shah Wali Kot, wary of improvised explosive devices planted in potholes. It might have looked like Wafa sat a safe distance from the war in Afghanistan, but he didn’t. By the time Wafa arrived at “Little Blue” to work, two DJs had been killed nearby. The remoteness of the base did nothing to alleviate the creeping feeling of siege mentality. “We did everything at Little Blue ourselves,” says one American soldier who worked with Wafa. “It was tiny.” Sometimes Wafa went along on patrol, microphone in hand, passing through the valleys in the backyard of the old Taliban capital of Kandahar City. 

Listen to the podcast version of “Outside the Wire”

One October day, a call came in to the studio. The local police had a Taliban fighter in a jail cell at the precinct. Come interview him, they said. Wafa grabbed his recorder and headed out.

He arrived at the police station. Rarely had he seen the Taliban up close. This Talib had been shot. Wafa started recording. The Talib explained he was caught searching a roadway for some recess to tuck a bomb into. Wafa asked why he joined the Taliban. He claimed to work for the Afghan police, but they were attacked by the Taliban one day, and they stole his money. So he decided to join the Taliban and exact revenge from the inside and, apparently, planned to eventually give inside information to the government. 

Wafa knew immediately that he was lying. Transparently bullshit Taliban stories deserved radio airtime right away.

Back at Little Blue, Wafa burned the lying Talib interview onto a CD and prepared the radio show. In that moment, Wafa was powerful, free to brandish his microphone in the enemy’s face. 

Within a few years, Little Blue and the radio station would be completely gone. Troops would be withdrawn, combat outposts shuttered, and, eventually, huge bases handed over to the Afghan military or taken over by weeds. Wafa would be permanently “outside the wire,” as they say, no longer protected by the blast walls and machine gun nests of Little Blue, and back in his hometown. Instead of Wafa running around with his recorder, the Taliban would be out seeking Wafa for an interview of their own, while he searched and begged for a way to escape.

During Wafa’s childhood, he rarely saw the Taliban. He grew up in a small village a couple of miles down a dirt road. He spent his boyhood sitting with his grandfather in their house, listening to BBC radio for hours on end. Wafa’s hero was the BBC Pashto correspondent Gohar Rahman Gohar. “He had this amazing voice,” Wafa says. He loved song requests and peppered the BBC with letters, three of which he says were read on air. This set Wafa running around the house, urgently telling his whole family. His next goal: actually getting his voice on air during a live call-in show. He came extremely close. A station took his call, and he queued up to go on. “But my phone ran out of batteries,” Wafa says.

When the United States invaded Afghanistan, Wafa was pro-American. He thought the nascent Afghan central government and the US had similar goals of progress in the country. He joined a team of Afghan journalists who made radio and television news broadcasts for the US Special Forces, which were transmitted out of the legendary CIA base Camp Chapman.

This wasn’t the United States’ first run at propaganda. When the US military arrived in Afghanistan, its go-to was leaflets. Planes flew over villages, dumping thousands of white papers. Pick one leaflet up, and a villager might read about 9/11 or the hunt for Osama bin Laden. But Afghanistan has one of the lowest literacy rates in the world. Sometimes pictures helped. One leaflet depicted bin Laden with part of his face flesh-eaten to reveal his skull. Experts don’t think they worked very well.  

The Radio in a Box was a psychological operation (or PSYOP, as the military and intelligence call it), and it was a huge strategic innovation in Afghanistan. In rural areas, about 75 percent of Afghans depend on the radio to get information. Generally, over 80 percent of Afghans have access to a radio. The US Army sought to capitalize, especially on its primary target: Pashtuns. Afghanistan is an amalgamation of ethnicities and tribes, but Pashtuns represent around 40 percent of the population. They are also the Taliban’s chief recruiting target. Wafa, and DJs like him, fought a psychological war against the Taliban inside Pashtun heads — a positive glimmer in a war for the hearts and minds of Afghanistan, which, until that point, had not been going well.

This is what made Radio in a Box such an exception to American psychological warfare: it was run by Afghans on a day-to-day basis, with PSYOP messaging handed down from the American command.

“I remember the Radio in a Box was a big deal and a lot of commanders liked it. They could instantly see the benefit of it. They could send out messages immediately about IEDs,” says Arturo Muñoz, a former CIA analyst who studies US PSYOP tactics. There was no other way. Many of the existing stations were afraid that airing anything that could be seen as pro-US material would make them bombing targets for the Taliban. So the military set up its own broadcast. 

Aside from the practicality and enormous reach of radio, Radio in a Box capitalized on one of the cornerstones of psychological warfare that Muñoz and his colleagues write about: credibility. It was by Afghan people and for the Afghan people. This was an important advance, and a journalistic interview by an Afghan radio personality with a lying Talib, like Wafa’s, was authentic. The best propaganda is actually true.

Muñoz points out that the Afghan DJs took on the risks of the American psychological war, especially those living outside the protection of the US bases, outside the wire, where Taliban lurked. When combat outposts started closing up, the territory was usually ceded right back to the Taliban weeks later. The DJs who were integral to the new push for credible propaganda were forced to play a fatal game of hot lava, hopping to a home village until the security situation deteriorated, then hopping to a new city as more and more patches of safety were gobbled up. When the US packed their equipment onto planes, the DJs were left behind. Muñoz says those DJs could be fugitives in their country forever: “Everyone knows they collaborated [with the US]. They were on the radio for Christsake!”

Back when the United States’ pullout was still years away, the US Army rolled out radio propaganda on a huge scale during President Obama’s troop surge. Money poured into security initiatives. Because the Radio in a Box program showed promise, the US was ready to expand it. They hired a private military contractor called Relyant to help. Relyant hired hundreds of Afghans like Wafa to DJ radio shows and deployed them to American bases, large and small. They worked under US command, occasionally receiving propaganda messaging issued from the chain of command. Other than that, the DJs were on their own, making their way through cans of American-issued Rip It energy drinks while they edited their interviews into the show and arranged their playlists. Wafa worked for nine months before the Relyant contract with the military’s Radio in a Box program ended sometime in 2013 and his show, Peace Radio, closed up shop. Wafa returned home, and that’s when the calls started.

It was the Taliban. They told him he collaborated with the US occupiers. He needed to come down and face trial at one of their courts. These so-called “courts” often ended with the defendant summarily executed. Wafa kept the threatening calls secret from his family, afraid it would scare them. He needed to get out of Afghanistan because, sooner or later, the Taliban would find him. When the United States drastically reduced its troop presence in 2014, the country’s security deteriorated. But there was one hope: the Special Immigrant Visa.

Stemming from a law that Congress barely passed, the Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) allocates visas to Iraqis and Afghans, among others, who worked for the United States during the wars. So long as an Afghan like Wafa could provide proof of employment, the correct letters of recommendation from supervisors, and worked for at least one year, they could flee to the United States. But keeping the program alive caused congressional mayhem.

“They’re going to die if we don’t pass this amendment and take them out of harm’s way. Don’t you understand that?”

Ever since Wafa applied, there have been SIV shortages. Thousands more visas are needed every year, and Congress has to create them. This culminated in two straight years of what one Senate staffer describes as a “knock down drag out fight.” Sens. Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH) and the late John McCain (R-AZ) led the charge for more visas. A vicious battle played out behind closed doors, and SIV applicants paid a high price. Three thousand visas were approved, but a web of new obstacles was packed in them, including a new two-year minimum of work by the applicant. The next year, Shaheen and McCain rallied to approve an amendment for another 4,000 visas.

On the floor of the Senate, Sen. Mike Lee (R-UT) blocked it, allegedly to leverage a different amendment into the bill. “McCain just went apeshit on him,” a Senate staffer says. McCain tore into Lee, “They’re going to die if we don’t pass this amendment and take them out of harm’s way. Don’t you understand that?” In the end, 2,500 visas were poised to be written into the bill — and they were — but only after another 1,000 visas were shaved off.

Wafa applied to the SIV program and was rejected, even with a glowing letter from his supervisor, Air Force Maj. Paul Wever. “Wafa was poised to take the district by storm and quickly established a strong following with a 14-hour-per-day schedule,” Wever wrote. But the letter missed several State Department requirements: Wafa’s date of birth, a statement that Wever was his supervisor, Wever’s contact information, a description of ongoing threats to Wafa’s life, and an assurance that he wasn’t a national security threat. When Wafa went looking for Wever for a revision, he couldn’t be found. This was a common problem. Time passed, and when Afghans who worked for the US went looking for their old bosses, they discovered email addresses no longer worked, phone numbers had changed, or contact information had been lost. In a different case that resembles Wafa’s, three DJs had a group picture of themselves standing with the American lieutenant from whom they needed a letter of recommendation. In the photo, they stood frustratingly close, side by side, but they were still unable to locate the lieutenant.

The State Department created a “Supervisor Locator” program to address the widespread struggle for SIV applicants searching for their military bosses: fill out a form, and the Department of Defense looks for an Afghan’s military supervisor. However, Betsy Fisher, a director at International Refugee Assistance Project (IRAP), an NGO that has helped thousands of Afghans apply for SIV, says, “There was one case several years ago where we saw the supervisor locator work, but we have not seen the locator work in several years.”

The State Department declined to comment.

These stories are among many. Twenty rejected DJs have come forward and shared their experiences with The Verge. Out of the hundreds of Afghans deployed to the frontlines, likely scores more have also been rejected. Similar to Wafa, every DJ I spoke to had received repeated death threats from the Taliban.

Wafa’s mediocre English has also faded. His go-tos were “What’s up?” and “How are you?” he says. He struggled to understand the SIV application in English, and the State Department does not offer the forms or instructions in the Afghan national languages of Dari or Pashto. Wafa says his denial letter from the State Department also said he failed to file the paperwork properly. The letter’s exact details on proper bureaucratic box-ticking were inscrutable to Wafa because it was written in English.

Some DJs did make it out of the country. Jan’s SIV process, for instance, went much differently. But his background, service, and staunchly pro-American views were irrelevant to his application. Jan’s chances for a visa rested in the hands of his military recommender. It didn’t matter that his personal history reads like dispatches from a lifelong anti-Taliban mission.

During the Soviet occupation of the ‘80s, Jan’s military family resisted the Mujahideen, parts of which came back together after the war and morphed into the Taliban the world knows today. Jan’s father worked for the Afghan intelligence agency KHAD, often as a driver. While transporting the Kabul intelligence chief in a food supply truck to avoid detection, they were ambushed. Gunfire pelted the truck, and 18 shots from an RPK machine gun left Jan’s father halfway-disemboweled. The Mujahideen inspected their bodies. The chief was dead, but Jan’s father was still breathing. One fighter asked aloud if they should finish him off. “No, let him suffer. He will die,” another said. Sitting in the driver’s seat, his father “collected his organs by his hand,” Jan says, and he tied a scarf around his abdomen to hold his guts in. He survived. The entire family supported the Americans when they arrived in 2001. They considered the Taliban antithetical to their Pashtun values. Afghanistan, however, had a 50-50 split opinion.

Jan’s dad taught him English, and Jan applied to work for the US as a translator, crushed his exams, and began helping with psychological operations for US Special Forces at the CIA’s Camp Chapman. Same as Wafa, in 2009, he was initiated into Radio in a Box. 

Relyant took over the operation around 2011, which was when things started to fall apart, Jan says, and other DJs agree. Relyant hired a new translator to help oversee the project, an Afghan named Hewad Hemat. DJs I spoke with say Hemat installed himself as an unofficial supervisor. One day, Jan covered a cricket match, and two other DJs came to help. When they returned, Hemat confronted the two DJs, claiming they shirked real work, and fired them. 

The phone calls from the Taliban had kept coming

This happened at other stations, too. Jan cataloged the firings: almost 15 DJs from six different bases. Another DJ said Hemat emailed his American commander claiming the DJ had contacts with the Taliban, but the commander knew this to be a lie. Still, the DJ claims Hemat’s false report to Relyant got him fired. Jan says that Hemat then hired his relatives into the open jobs. An “Afghan system of corruption,” he calls it.

One DJ who is now struggling to put together an SIV application says that Hemat is his “aunt’s daughter’s husband’s brother.” He got the job because his cousin, who is also related to Hemat, recommended him.

Hemat calls the DJs’ claims “baseless accusations.” In an interview, Hemat claimed he did not hire relatives. Also, he adamantly insisted that only Relyant controlled hiring and did not oversee firing. He says the US military was the only authority who could let go of DJs, but he did add that Relyant fired a site manager for unspecified corruption allegations.

However, among the hundreds of documents that DJs gave to The Verge, there are several signed DJ contracts. Each contract states that “Relyant may terminate this Agreement before the anticipated ending date at its sole discretion for any reason, which will be effective immediately upon Relyant’s verbal or written notice of termination.”

When I read the firing clause over the phone to Hemat, he again insisted that firing DJs required military approval. Hemat declined to provide documents he has that support his assertions, citing “personal information.” He said he could not comment on firings alleged by DJs who, concerned for their safety from the Taliban, talked to me only on the condition of anonymity.

To Jan, these firings were a huge loss of experienced DJs, and Hemat’s family was clueless about radio. Once, a Hemat hire cussed on air, causing a furor that ended with an officer trying to calm down an angry village elder. Jan confronted Hemat and complained to the American commanding officer, but nothing happened. Relyant’s Radio in a Box contract with the military ended in 2013, the radio stations shut down, and, soon after, US troops began to pull out.

Around this time, Jan received death threats. “The enemy sent a letter to my home and they were threatening my life, my daddy, my brother,” Jan says.

One day, Jan was inside his base when he picked up a call. “Hey, we can kill you today.” Jan, indignant at first, asked, “How?” The caller claimed to have his location, his information, everything. Jan realized it wouldn’t be hard to determine his whereabouts. “I was a DJ. I was very famous,” he explains. More threats were mixed into reams of fan mail, including one love letter from a woman who claimed she wrote Jan’s name on the front and back of a piece of paper and swallowed it. 

It was a terrifying time for Jan. When he walked through villages, he wondered who might try to kill him. Many DJs carried multiple cellphones as a safety measure. The tactic was to quarantine all of their work for the US military onto one phone. That phone was used to interview people, orchestrate call-in shows, and take song requests. That “show” phone stayed on the base. Their other phone was dedicated to family and personal contacts, so if the Taliban stopped and questioned them, they could plausibly deny cooperating with the US. DJs went even further to obscure their relationship with coalition forces. One DJ who worked with Jan protected himself with camouflage; he grew a thick beard, which is generally forbidden by the US Army. “Americans would call me Jesus,” he says. Another DJ, still in Afghanistan, says he speaks a fake dialect to disguise his well-known voice. 

DJs who stay in Afghanistan to apply for an SIV face a different fatal risk: wait times

Jan, fearing for his life, applied for an SIV and got it in six months. His wife and kids moved to Buffalo, New York, where Jan now works as a private security guard most nights. Jan jokes that, one day, he’ll change his name to John “when I apply for my citizenship.” Almost his entire family remained in Afghanistan. A couple of years ago, Jan’s brother was shot in the stomach by assassins. He survived.

In 2015, Congress increased the mandatory time of employment for Afghans to be eligible for an SIV from one year to two years, a dramatic new obstacle. Jan says at least 15 DJs he knew personally were rejected from the SIV program because their employment was cut short of two years by Hemat. In 2017, Hemat was Sen. Richard Blumenthal’s (D-CT) special guest at President Trump’s speech to a joint session of Congress where Hemat says he lobbied for the SIV program. Today, he lives in Connecticut on an SIV. 

Relyant handed out boilerplate letters for employment verification, or “HR letters,” which are crucial to the SIV application. In some cases, Relyant’s staff members didn’t reply to DJs’ requests for employment verification. Other Relyant boilerplates included classic “certificates of appreciation,” which the State Department has never recognized as a qualifying document for SIV. A few certificates are signed by a Relyant project manager who says he had never heard of the Radio in a Box program. Wafa says Relyant did nothing to help him find his military supervisor. He sent repeated emails to his Relyant supervisor and never received a reply. A dozen DJs I spoke to say they experienced the same problem. The company’s old slogan adorns the DJ’s boilerplate certificates: “A Promise Delivered.” 

Relyant did not respond to requests for an interview or follow-up requests for comment. 

Jan thinks Relyant was aware of the risks of DJ work. One former Relyant site manager confirmed Jan’s suspicion in a brief phone call. “It was a dangerous job for them, I believe,” says John Bagby, who managed 20 to 30 DJs. Jan got lucky. His Army supervisor told him that if he couldn’t get Jan into the United States, he’d never forgive himself.

Wafa worked nine months and six days for Relyant. If the three months he says he handled PSYOPs for the US Special Forces can be accounted for, he squeaks over the original one-year work requirement. But now, it’s two years. Wafa considered appealing his rejected application.

DJs who stay in Afghanistan to apply for an SIV face a different fatal risk: wait times. State Department statistics suggest SIV processing doesn’t take so long. However, in a lawsuit against the State Department, lawyers for the International Refugee Assistance Project discovered that the data systematically undercounts processing times. Time awaiting interview scheduling, time spent doing background checks, and time the consular officer spends making a final decision, among other time sinks, isn’t counted. The maximum legal wait time is nine months. The State Department already confesses it was blowing the deadlines in the statute and reported that it was racking up an additional nine months in wait time on average. IRAP, on the other hand, closely tracks wait times and says the situation is even worse than the State Department admits. They estimate the first step in an SIV application, which is a petition to the National Visa Center, takes two and a half to three years for Afghan SIV “class members”; for Iraqis, it takes five years. IRAP found that after the US Embassy approves a petition, 2,300 SIV applicants have waited an average of three years for a final say. In September, a judge gave the State Department 30 days to come up with a plan to fix the backlog.

Wafa couldn’t afford to wait for the SIV system’s notorious backlogs. The phone calls from the Taliban had kept coming, and, finally, he confided in his dad. His wife, two daughters, and son were at risk, he said. They agreed he needed to leave.

Wafa paid $5,000 from his savings to an illegal human smuggling operation. The destination was Europe — specifically, Germany. What really mattered to him was that he protected himself from the threats to his life in Afghanistan. Beyond that, he was flexible. But the journey to Europe was filled with dangerous prospects. When Jan heard about Wafa’s plan, he called him up. 

“There are security forces in every country, they can shoot you, no one wants illegal immigrants!” Jan told Wafa. “Wafa, you should not do this because you can die.” 

Lawyers for IRAP estimate they’ve met more than 100 Afghans who worked for the United States and who, because of problems with SIV applications, went to Europe to plead for asylum. And it’s unlikely they took a straightforward trip to get there. Ignoring Jan, Wafa traveled to Kabul with two friends. At 2AM, they prepared to board a bus for the border with Pakistan. Wafa’s father was there. He offered a prayer aloud for a safe journey. With tears in his eyes, he hugged Wafa goodbye. “Just pray for me,” Wafa told him. 

II.

The bus trundled
into Quetta, Pakistan.

They decamped into the desert and clambered through loose, gravelly hills. Water was scarce. As they descended into the flatlands, Wafa and his friends say they saw human body parts scattered on the ground. One believes they were migrants like them who hadn’t made it, the bodies from shallow burials, exhumed by the wind.

Pickup trucks arrived, and Wafa and somewhere around 35 other Afghans piled into the back. They cut through the middle of the orange pebbly desert, headed for the unmarked border with Iran. Exhaust and dust kicked up in their faces, covering them. In the middle of the desert, the trucks slowed down. There was a checkpoint in the distance. As soon as they were close enough, they could see who was manning the roadblock: the Taliban.

The group of Taliban forced the pickup to a stop. Wafa and his friends were terrified. They were told to get out. Wafa and the Afghans spilled out of the back, and the Taliban gathered them next to the pickups. The Taliban didn’t recognize Wafa, but he knew he was a wanted man, that he had been summoned many times for what he expected to be an execution. What unfolded in the desert instead was something of a roadside sermon.

The Taliban talked about the correct interpretation of Islam, “what to do, what not to do,” who is Taliban, who is not Taliban, and a message to oppose the Afghan national government. The pressure over the entire situation began to lift. It became clear to Wafa that this was a pointless Taliban PSYOP administered in the middle of the desert to migrants and refugees, some of whom were leaving precisely because of them.

They got back into the pickups, and once they crossed the border into Iran, the Afghans were piped into a sprawling smuggling network toward Europe. Generally, the only information the smugglers knew was the next drop-off location. The Afghans moved through an endless series of safe houses and, once, a cow barn. 

“We were herded like animals,” Wafa says. They were dropped by the Turkish border and scaled freezing mountains on foot, around cliff faces and through precipitous ravines, crested the top, and picked their way into Turkey. Smugglers showed up in cars, and Wafa and the Afghans jumped in. They got their first shower in Istanbul. The smugglers advised they buy energy drinks and cookies for their most formidable obstacle: Bulgaria. The strategy was to spirit themselves through Bulgaria’s forests on foot. An Afghan migrant like Wafa had been shot on the country’s border.

The smugglers took Wafa and the Afghans to the edge of a massive forest in Turkey. By this point, they had been traveling for about 45 days, and after issuing directions to march through it to the other side, the smugglers left. Wafa and the Afghans set off into the woods. When it started to get dark, they found a place to huddle together beneath the treetops. No one slept. Hours later, they staggered out of the forest, hungry, onto a road. They were inside Bulgaria now. They waited, and two cars arrived. Everyone jumped in, and they sped for Sofia, arriving at night. The 25 or so Afghans were led to a dirty three-room house where they slept on the floor, using their backpacks as pillows. They were unable to go outside for about five days, as the smugglers price-gouged them for groceries. The smugglers moved them at night and drove to yet another forest to pass through, undetected. Wafa and his friends’ heads spun with rumors of migrant killings, true and false, and believed the police were constantly searching for them.

“Of course, they lied to us. That’s what the smugglers do to you.”

When Wafa and the Afghans emerged from the woods, the smugglers led them to an open field and told them to stay put. Then the smugglers said they would scout for police activity. An hour passed. Then two. Then three. “We were just left there,” Wafa says. Despite the smuggling expenses they paid, suddenly, they had nowhere to go. “Of course, they lied to us,” Wafa says. “That’s what the smugglers do to you.” Abandoned and panicked, the Afghans broke into groups, setting off in different directions. Wafa and six others stuck together. They wandered for hours, until they encountered a shepherd — two of them, older Bulgarian women, tending their sheep. They were not alarmed by the Afghans, and they began talking. By this point, Wafa and his friends were half-crazed with hunger. They asked if there was any food nearby. Yes, there was a village with one small restaurant. They asked about police, any other threat of being caught by authorities. No, the shepherds reassured them, there were no police here. 

They made their way along a road, and as they walked, a car crept up and passed slowly. A man and a woman were inside. Up ahead, the car stopped. When Wafa and his friends passed the car, it leapfrogged ahead again. Wafa’s friend turned to the group. “This car is suspicious. We should ask them what they want from us.” They talked and asked if food was nearby. “Yes, come and follow us!” the couple said. The friends were unsettled. It didn’t take long before the driver hit the brakes and came to a complete stop. He stepped out of the car and stood there. In Bulgarian, he told them not to run, the police were coming. The friends looked at each other. It was the betrayal they halfway expected and feared most.

They made for the woods, climbed down into a ravine, and waited intently for any sign of the police pursuit. They were unsure whether they had escaped. After a while, they sent a friend up the hillside to have a look. He didn’t come back down. The rest followed. When they emerged from the forest, they were surrounded by police. As soon as the cops saw Wafa and his friends, they fired warning shots in the air. The Afghans were rounded up at gunpoint. One of Wafa’s friends, Ahmed, tried to talk to the police. Communication was difficult. An officer punched him in the head and neck, twice, and ordered him to sit. The rest didn’t need to be told.

The officers confiscated their phones, money, and bags and took them to a detention center called Busmantsi on the outskirts of Sofia. The prison was all square lines, tall stucco walls, razor wire, and, in the winter, it was surrounded by bleak open land and a hamlet of houses. It had a huge steel blue gate for cars, with a human-sized door built into the lower-right corner. Beside the gate, a placard: “Ministry of Interior – Migration Directorate.” Inside, it was filthy and overcrowded with migrant detainees. Wafa and his friends were released into a giant room with no assigned bunks, but, lucky for them, they found a place to sleep. They ate two small meals a day. There was no bathroom after 10PM, meaning people relieved themselves in their cells. Some of the Afghans said it might be worth deporting themselves back home rather than stay in Bulgaria, whose government they viewed as more corruption-riddled than Afghanistan’s. 

After 24 days, they were released. The Bulgarian authorities took their fingerprints. “They think that even if you go to some other European countries you will be sent back to Bulgaria,” Wafa says. It’s likely the fingerprints were just mind games. Any refugee can apply for asylum in the EU country of their choosing. Wafa and his friends left and reunited with their smuggler, demanding they go directly to Serbia. The smugglers simply drove across the border this time. From Serbia, it was a series of bus transfers and train rides to Croatia, Slovenia, Austria, and, finally, Germany, where Wafa disembarked in Cologne. A friendly German aid worker greeted him with a hot meal and clothes. 

He applied for asylum and was given a government-issue apartment in a small town called Elsdorf. The German authorities called him in for an interview. Days later, he received a letter. His interview was deemed not credible and had been denied asylum. There was no explanation. Wafa still wonders why his application was rejected.

He hired a German lawyer with wild gray hair named Frank Schönebeck for 900 euros. When Schönebeck inspected Wafa’s documents, he turned to him in disbelief and said the German authorities’ decision was insane. Wafa’s Radio in a Box documents were compelling. Schönebeck told Wafa he could keep his 900 euros and that he was confident his client would get his asylum papers in eight months to a year, after Wafa appears in a court appeal. 

Until very recently, he didn’t have papers to work in Germany while his case was processed. During that time, his family has slipped into poverty while he stayed inside his apartment in Elsdorf, alone.

“I just want to go to the court and defend myself… My family is away from me for four years now,” Wafa says. “What is my crime?” 

Shortly before July 4th, I got Maj. Paul Wever’s phone number. Had Wafa been able to reach him for the elusive letter of recommendation, it may have helped his SIV process. I tried calling Wever. No answer. I texted, wanting to know how he might have felt about Wafa’s fate, what his sympathies were as commanding officer. Five days later, Wever texted back. He wasn’t sure whether he could go on the record. He wanted to check with US Central Command Public Affairs first. I contacted that office, and they had no objection. Still, Wever went dark.

One information operations military officer directly involved with the DJs did eventually talk to me about the Radio in a Box program. “Albeit the toughest deployment and most dangerous… the most fulfilling, like as a self-actualization thing,” he says. He remembers their motto, “first with the truth,” where, in the wake of a bombing, they were racing the Taliban and other groups like al-Qaeda to get their reporting and side of the story on the radio first. “From a perspective of loyalty, I really think the DJs put their neck on the line to be on the air,” he says. As for the tougher SIV rules, “personally, I don’t think two years is just. One year is” because he says the danger was so extremely acute for the DJs. “I try to fathom it, these guys are just playing music and reading scripts.”

I texted Wever more details about Wafa’s story. Nothing. Finally, I sent photos of Wafa. “Do you remember him?” A picture of Wafa receiving a framed certificate from an Army officer, a picture in front of a military vehicle, a picture of Wafa standing next to a sergeant on patrol, him cradling his M4 machine gun, Wafa’s microphone at his side. No response except for the faint gray text marked below the photos — read receipts, indicating Wever had seen my messages.

Recently, Wafa found work at an Epson warehouse, slapping promotional stickers on printer boxes. One purple sticker from a thick roll boasts to the consumer, “Nuance Power PDF.” His schedule flips between day and night shifts. The company has the police come down routinely to review Wafa and his co-workers’ work certifications, and Wafa is exhausted all the time. Despite his agony searching for safety outside the SIV system, the mere mention of his past work for Radio in a Box still prompts a grin of recognition, a snap, and he points a finger gun. Wafa can’t muster a single bad word about the United States. 

“I dedicated myself to them,” he says. “Honestly I was working for them with my heart.” Sometimes, Wafa is so confused by his SIV rejection that he pins the blame on himself. “Maybe it was my English. I’m not very good at English and I’m not fluent,” Wafa says. “It might be my problem.” 

If Wafa’s bid for asylum in Germany fails, he says he would go to the nearest US Embassy in Germany and present all of his documents one last time. He still believes the US might help him. “I was loyal to them,” he says, still hopeful.

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Christopher Harland-Dunaway <![CDATA[The sound of justice]]> https://www.theverge.com/2019/4/25/18514298/nazi-germany-holocaust-records-audio-lost-saved-hitler-nuremberg-trials 2019-04-25T11:05:32-04:00 2019-04-25T11:05:32-04:00

By November 21st, 1945, Adolf Hitler was dead, but the Nazi chain of command he left behind was sitting in court. In the ruins of the German city of Nuremberg, inside the Palace of Justice, Room 600, they faced charges of conspiracy, waging aggressive war, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. Behind the Nazis stood a line of American military police in gleaming white helmets. The Nazi defendants picked up translation headphones from the armrests beside them and placed them on their heads. In the center of the courtroom, Robert Jackson, an American, walked up to a lectern and placed his opening prosecution statement in front of him. Jackson had skipped college and spent only a year at law school, but he nonetheless went on to become an associate justice of the United States Supreme Court. Now, he was chief prosecutor in the world’s fragile first experiment in international justice, which was made possible, in part, by an unprecedented audio system.

Every tale of atrocity, every victim’s raw testimony, and every revelation that exposed the upside-down logic of the Nazi system flowed through the headphones of a man along the wood-paneled wall of the courtroom. He rested his fingers lightly on a volume dial, as audio from the trial was filtered through a dozen language interpreters. His name was Philip C. Erhorn, and as the chief technician at Nuremberg, he cobbled together a sound system that relayed and recorded the voices in the courtroom. He did it mostly on his own, despite the team of technicians that was assembled to help him. “They didn’t know what end of the screwdriver to use,” he later told his wife.

no one had attempted to record the audio for such a complicated court case

Erhorn was an audio specialist hired by the US Army Signal Corps who grew up fascinated with hand-crank radios. When he went to Lehigh University, he got special access to a room of music records, which touched off a lifelong obsession for recording things. Sometimes when he babysat his neighbor’s kids, he raided their tape collection for even more music to record.

As Erhorn listened on the first day, a judge pushed himself toward a microphone on the bench and beckoned Jackson to begin the prosecution’s opening statement. Someone coughed, then there was silence. “The privilege of opening the first trial in history for crimes against the peace of the world poses a grave responsibility,” Jackson said into his microphone on the lectern. Erhorn sat in his green officer’s uniform, intensely focused, listening, as the microphone sent the sound through his mixer and into a maze of wires and recorders. What followed was what some consider to be one of the most important speeches of all time. It entered Erhorn’s audio system, to be saved forever.

General Rudenko from Russia made the final prosecutor’s statement after the British and French took their turns. Interpreters translated on the spot. The system fed the translation audio into a now-antique recorder called a recordgraph, which looks more like an old movie projector than an audio device. Meanwhile, the prosecutor, witnesses, and defendants were recorded in whichever language they spoke, verbatim. The words of their native tongues were relayed to a hi-fidelity gramophone recorder, and a stylus etched the sound waves into the surface of circular black disc records. The grooves the stylus traced contained the voices of the Nuremberg trials.

The plan had always been to preserve these moments so that the crimes of the defendants would never be repeated. But in the years ahead, the record collection fell through the cracks.

In 1945, no one had attempted to record the audio for such a complicated court case, nor had anyone tried to translate a multilingual meeting in real time. For centuries, Western diplomacy was conducted solely in French. Nuremberg, however, required English, German, Russian, and French to be translated simultaneously. To keep things simple, anyone listening in the courtroom needed to be able to find their native language simply by flipping between four channels. The end product, a simple audio record of each speaker, took an extraordinarily coordinated effort to produce.

Ambros On Trial

Erhorn and his fellow technicians bought a new IBM machine called “the Translator,” which was shipped by plane from New York to Nuremberg. It was based on an experimental system that had been used in a court case in South America. When the Translator arrived in Nuremberg, the technicians had to wire the court. The whole production started at the point where the human voice went into the system: the microphone. The eight judges had four microphones to share, the prosecution had one, the witness stand had a microphone, another sat at the front of the courtroom, and then there was a “roving microphone” for the Nazis to pass around their court dock.

The sound traveled from the microphones to Erhorn’s amplifier, which he carefully monitored for the translators. There were four teams of translators separated by glass partitions who were deeply focused, listening to every word. Each team had three to four interpreters specializing in a single language. They could take Russian, for example, and translate it accurately into English, French, and German immediately. When anyone spoke into the microphones too quickly and the court got too far ahead of the translations, the interpreters raised a yellow card in distress, signaling “slower.” If the translators were totally overwhelmed, they raised a pleading red card, signaling “stop.” A red card meant the entire trial, no matter the gravity of the moment, came to a halt. A complete backup team of translators waited on standby, should a rescue be needed. The entire system used at least 500 headphones, half used by the technicians, and the other 250 for listeners in court. In a two-month scramble, Erhorn and his team of technicians invented the translation system the United Nations still uses to this day.

In the weeks before Erhorn assembled the system, he and his colleagues heard classical music echoing through the rubble nearby Nuremberg. They followed the sound and could soon discern that it was Wagner. When they found the source, it was a tape player, which Erhorn had not seen before, possibly because it was developed by the Americans for “clandestine telephone tapping purposes” during the war. Immediately, Erhorn decided to use the technology in the trial to record the translators. The interpreters’ voices were recorded onto embossed tape for the stenographers to match their court transcripts against and argue over the quality of the translation.

Embossed tape, a clear-colored film also known as Amertape (as in “America”), was a precursor to 1980s-style magnetic cassette tape. Soundwaves of a recording were carved directly into the Amertape with a needle. One Amertape collector said his tapes from the D-Day invasion in 1944 are still playable, but it’s unclear how gracefully the Nuremberg translation Amertapes aged. “It can decompose into a nasty jelly,” one expert says. Some archives preferred to transfer embossed Amertape recordings onto magnetic tape, which has its own problems: it degrades after 30 years. Today, these tapes are likely irretrievably expired, and their location is unknown.

Then there was the verbatim audio, which skipped the translation phase and went off in a wire outside the courtroom to a studio. There, the original voices were recorded onto black disc gramophone records with a cellulose trinitrate lacquer surface and aluminum core made by the Presto Recording Corporation. Nitrate-based films and lacquers also have problems: they’re flammable. Luckily, the aluminum core of the gramophone record “acts as a heat sink if the record catches fire,” one archiving expert says. But if the nitrate lacquer has deteriorated into a reddish powder, “tiptoe away and call the bomb disposal squad.”

The longer the records sat, forgotten in The Hague, the less likely they could be preserved

When the trial ended and Hermann Göring and several other Nazis were sentenced to hang to death, 1,942 Presto gramophone discs with at least 775 hours of the trial recorded on them were packed into wooden crates. What exactly happened to these crates is subject to debate. They may have become an overlooked line item in an archive in The Hague, Netherlands, or they may have been forgotten. The International Court of Justice, which is located in The Hague, says the collection was part of the Nuremberg archive and is so physically large that they would be impossible to lose track of. But the cellulose trinitrate lacquer on the Presto records put them at risk. The lacquer can shrink over time and crack, destroying the record. The longer the records sat, forgotten in The Hague, the less likely it became that Erhorn and his team’s recordings could be preserved.

In Switzerland, there is a city of red roofs built along stone cliffs and woods where the Schiffenensee River runs. It’s an old city called Fribourg, and it’s where Ottar Johnsen, a silver-haired Swiss professor of signal processing lived and worked for most of his career. He specialized in the electronic transfer of images and audio technology. In the event that the Nuremberg records were remembered and pulled out of their archive, the trajectory of his research could save them from deterioration. Johnsen is imaginative and willing to try any idea. His Swiss-French accent curls Rs in his throat when he speaks his very fluent English. As he likes to jest, “I perfected it in New Jersey.”

Johnsen’s career really took off when he joined the Bell Laboratories research complex in rural New Jersey. The place was a centrifuge of scientific innovation. It pulled from various fields and theories to invent things like transistors, lasers, the Unix computer operating system, and programming languages like C, C++, and S. At Bell Laboratories in the 1980s, Johnsen discovered new ways to compress images so they could quickly be sent electronically. Soon after, he returned to Switzerland to work at the University of Fribourg, which was when, in the twilight of his career, a colleague from the Swiss National Sound Archives approached him with “a completely strange idea.”

War Trial

The colleague was Stefano Cavaglieri. The premise of Cavaglieri’s idea was that when you look at a vinyl record, the sound is etched into the physical surface of the grooves. Cavaglieri wondered, why not photograph the physical surface and try to extract the sound from the image? “It will never work,” Johnsen thought, “but it is a very interesting project to do with a student.”

Johnsen found an enthusiastic PhD student named Sylvain Stotzer who wanted to research the idea. In only a few months, they had already extracted their first sounds from a picture of a record. It sounded bad. “Then, we discovered we needed to reverse it,” Johnsen says. The sound they extracted was backward, but it worked. After it was fixed, Johnsen and Stotzer knew they had something. They called the technology Visual Audio. Right away, archivists pointed out that the technology could make crucial rescues. Records that were too delicate or damaged to be read with a conventional record player needle could have their sound extracted visually.

Then, serendipity. “In 2006, I got a call from Radio Netherlands [Worldwide],” Johnsen says. The radio producer had talked to a librarian at the International Court of Justice, and they had found the Nuremberg recordings. “They had, in a way, been forgotten, not lost, but forgotten somewhere in the archive,” Johnsen says. “So I was astonished when I heard about it.” Employees of the International Court of Justice arranged to meet Johnsen at the University of Fribourg to do a test run on the records using his Visual Audio process. They had no idea if the recordings were any good.

The discs were forgotten, but miraculously well-preserved

They met Johnsen with a box. He pulled a disc from one of its waxy paper sleeves and inspected it, finding them “forgotten but very well-preserved.” Johnsen and Stotzer began the process. First, they took film pictures in a dark room. Inside the dark room, they developed the negative of the first photo of the first record. Then, they took the negative and placed it inside a specially-designed high-resolution scanner. As the scanner prepared to take an image, it spun the negative like a top. They put the image on a computer and used an algorithm that Stotzer had written to read the sound in the picture. “The sound is contained in the depth of the groove or the position of the groove. At the microscopic level, you can see how the groove is moving,” Johnsen explains. The sound output “will look like a sine wave.” The wobbly undulations in the surface were captured in Johnsen’s pictures of the disc. The priceless record was untouched.

It worked. He listened to Erhorn’s recording of Chief Prosecutor Jackson delivering his opening statement on the first day of the trials. “It was very, very clear,” Johnsen says. Compared to the transcripts of the trial, there was something different in hearing it, the momentousness of the moment imbued Jackson’s voice. “It was important for him to get the message out about the bad things they did. It was as important as the procedure of judging the criminals,” Johnsen says. He could hear both, and he couldn’t wait to digitize the entire collection.

Nazis In Dock

But things did not go as expected. Johnsen did a sample Visual Audio extract of 10 records and gave the International Court of Justice an estimate of $190,000 to digitize the entire collection. The archives found it difficult to cut a check to Johnsen if he didn’t have a company assembled to do the work. There are very strict procurement procedures. They went back and forth over the course of hundreds of emails. Johnsen started to get nervous. Things went quiet. For years, he heard nothing. He retired from his university before any final word came in. When he left, he gathered all of the samples of the Nuremberg recordings that he made and brought them home for safekeeping. “So many things disappear when people retire,” he says. He even made up his mind that he would come out of retirement to digitize the recordings if it was necessary. Johnsen continued to worry about it.

Cost is a constant problem among international organizations. The public tends to imagine institutions like the United Nations as incredibly wealthy and far-reaching. But some run on a relative shoestring budget. Take the International Criminal Court, for example. In 2013, the prosecutor’s office that was tasked with hunting down war criminals anywhere in the world and building credible cases against them ran on about $150 million. It may sound generous, but it’s roughly equivalent to the combined budget of the District Attorney’s office in New York City and Washington, DC.

We have the technology to preserve the records, but not the budget

No action was taken on Johnsen’s offer. Back when Johnsen inspected the records for the first time, he had suggested they test a recording needle on the first few seconds of quiet at the beginning of each record when it’s only people walking into the courtroom and shuffling chairs. Those moments weren’t as important, and they could be played to test the discs’ durability under a record needle, even if they got damaged. That was good advice, it seems. In 2017, the archives at the International Court of Justice decided to use a company in France that uses a record needle to play the records and digitize them. Johnsen thinks it should work. But as Johnsen points out, “It’s like painting a wall: some of the paint comes off with the brush.” The needle will work, but it also might damage the records. “When there are more than a thousand records, maybe a few of them would be damaged or difficult to play again,” Johnsen says. If that’s the case, Johnsen’s technology is always available to perform a rescue. The International Court of Justice hopes to have the records digitized in 2019, but they may not be made available to the public yet. Employees of the International Court of Justice describe the institution as “a very deliberate organization.”

One of the reporters in Nuremberg covering the trials for the Stars and Stripes military daily was Norbert Ehrenfreund. He was deeply affected by what he saw. Years later, he became a federal judge in California and wrote a book about Nuremberg. In it he wrote, “Soon all of the survivors of the Holocaust will be gone. Then there will be no human voice to tell the authentic story of the genocide, the tortures, the gas chambers, the concentration camps.” With what seems to be relief, he also wrote: “But the authentic, official record is the trial transcript.” It appears he, like many others, sees the transcript of the trials and the voices of the victims as two separate documents that cannot be merged. This is the power of Nuremberg recordings: it’s both.

Erhorn and Johnsen saw the power of the sound and resolved to preserve it for future generations. “When you have the sound, you feel you are in the middle of it,” Johnsen says, his voice conjuring a world suddenly accessible to the imagination. Then, his tone hardens. “When you have just the transcript, you are outside it.”

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