Solaris begins with a simple, evocative setup. Three scientists studying an alien planet begin receiving unwelcome “visitors” — apparently human figures from the long-dead past, returned to haunt the living. They appear (and reappear) while the scientists sleep, as though dragged into the waking light from the deepest recesses of their subconscious guilt, dread, and regret. Sent to investigate, psychologist Kris Kelvin awakens next to his wife, who’d killed herself 10 years earlier. Is she “real”? How did she arrive at the space station? And how is she connected to the ocean planet, Solaris?
For Stanislaw Lem, author of the original 1961 novel, this setting provided an opportunity to critique one of science fiction’s most treasured tropes: the “first contact” with alien life. Writing in Poland under Communism, Lem considered American sci-fi shallow and pretentious; consisting mostly of Space Westerns aimed at adolescents, it failed to address deep philosophical or scientific ideas. (With Philip K. Dick a notable exception — Lem dubbed him “a visionary among the charlatans.”)
How would human beings react to a life-form so foreign as to be beyond comprehension?
In American sci-fi, the aliens were always weird, but recognizable as either allies or enemies. Lem wanted to imagine an encounter with something truly alien. How would human beings react to a life-form so foreign as to be beyond comprehension? He imagined a planet-wide sentient ocean so frustratingly non-communicative that scientists would spend their lives trying to unlock its secrets. They’d produce quasi-religious speculations about the “cosmic yogi” or the “oceanic idiot,” revere it as an ascended mind or denounce it as childish, prehuman in its development. They’d devote Talmudic attention to reading its roiling forms; they’d lose themselves in its waves. Finally, they’d try to get its attention. And when that attention came, it would be like nothing they could have predicted.
Lem’s Solaris is a genre-busting book, a novel of ideas less interested in debating those ideas than in cataloging them. Skewering academic specialization, Lem describes the fat volumes produced by generations of Solarists, from the first-generation swashbuckling adventurers to the careerist, specialized researchers who followed. Theories bloomed. A bureaucracy arose to discipline and circumscribe the realm of respectable speculation by awarding study grants. Popular opinion moved with the tides of scientific hypotheses.
Space exploration is not about fathoming the universe, but imposing our own all-too-human will upon it
Wedged between the tomes is a pamphlet, whose author boldly declared there never could be human “contact” with a nonhuman civilization. While the protagonist calls that argument a “satire against the entire species,” it’s essentially Lem’s point: space exploration is not about fathoming the universe, but imposing our own all-too-human will upon it. As one scientist remarks, “We have no need of other worlds. We need mirrors. We don’t know what to do with other worlds. One world is enough, even there we feel stifled.” Mankind gazes into the unknown and sees his own face reflected back, either idealized or rendered primitive. No wonder that when the sentient ocean finally makes “contact,” it does so through the most powerful, most awful memories — it becomes the scientists’ black mirror. “We have it, this contact!” one of them exclaims. “Our own monstrous ugliness, our own buffoonery and shame, magnified as if it was under a microscope!” You can practically hear the mad cackling.
When the Russian film master Andrei Tarkovsky adapted Solaris, he jettisoned almost all of Lem’s philosophizing. (Like Stanley Kubrick, whose 2001: A Space Odyssey he considered cold and sterile, Tarkovsky took a cavalier attitude toward rendering the work of others.) In some ways, his film is richer for it: where Lem executed a thought experiment about alien contact, Tarkovsky moves the focus away from the ocean planet and onto the people overcome in its wake. Most of the characters remain sketchy in Lem’s depiction, but Tarkovsky gives them personalities and human histories.
By turning his camera away from the planet, Tarkovsky examines a different kind of mirror. Kelvin’s deceased wife, Hari, reappears on the space station — but she’s only Hari the way he remembers her. Assembled by the ocean from moments of Kelvin’s memory, she has no inner life of her own. Initially horrified by her return, Kelvin comes to love her again, but his love is born of guilt over their shared past. She, meanwhile, begins to realize that she’s not “real.” Despite Kelvin’s protests, she cannot see herself as fully human. She’s a shallow mirror for Kelvin’s feelings about her, familiar in appearance and yet foreign and distant as an alien planet.
Tarkovsky’s 166-minute Solaris became an art-house classic, a meditation on grief and alienation that just happened to be set on a space station. Stephen Soderbergh’s underrated 2002 adaptation, despite the director’s claim to have returned to the themes of Lem’s novel, is even more grief-stricken, featuring a morose George Clooney as Kelvin. Yet where Tarkovsky’s film is expansive and atmospheric, Soderbergh’s is elliptical and atmospheric, running just 99 minutes. It’s dreamlike and suggestive, to the point where late-stage plot developments seem like an attempt to make something happen.
Lem, of course, hated both adaptations. Or at least the idea of them, since he’d seen only pieces of Tarkovsky’s and none of Soderbergh’s. “I only wanted to create a vision of a human encounter with something that certainly exists, in a mighty manner perhaps, but cannot be reduced to human concepts, ideas or images,” he wrote. “This is why the book was entitled Solaris and not Love in Outer Space.”
Luckily, as readers and viewers we don’t have to be so dismissive. There’s room in the universe for all three interpretations of Solaris (oh, and a Russian made-for-TV miniseries). From Lem’s philosophical novel, to Tarkovsky’s filmic rumination on morality and “progress,” to Soderbergh’s beautifully rendered world of grief and loss, each makes its own unique claim to classic status.
]]>Artist Trevor Paglen spends much of his time photographing places you’re not supposed to see, whether that’s desert military bases or mountainside listening posts or classified spacecraft. His first photographic monograph, Invisible: Covert Operations and Classified Landscapes, captured those secret spaces as hazy, nearly unreadable images: a collection of lights on the horizon, or a dark smear across the sky. He’s also reported on the CIA’s covert rendition flights and collected 70 military patches representing secret government projects.
Most recently, he rented a helicopter to photograph several intelligence headquarters: the (now) well-known National Security Agency; the National Reconnaissance Office, which administers intelligence satellites; and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, which provides mapping and geographical data to the government. Paglen released his images into the public domain. Via email, he discussed what intrigues him about such secret spaces and what images of them allow us, the viewers, to consider.
You’ve long been intrigued by images of what you call “blank spots on the map” — a worldwide archipelago of classified military bases, intelligence headquarters, and monitoring installations that comprise the secret state. What makes you want to portray those spaces?
American intelligence and military agencies have a huge footprint in terms of how the world works, but they’re largely invisible. I’m interested in exploring those “geographies” of secrecy from many different angles: political, legal, economic, spatial, etc., because I am fundamentally just interested in how the world works and how societies work. On a more artistic level, I’m interested in questions having to do with what we can know and what we can’t, the relationship between visibility and invisibility and so on. Seeing various aspects of the secret state and surveillance state echoes a long tradition in art of looking at the sublime. If someone like [German Romantic landscape painter] Caspar David Friedrich were alive today, I think he’d be pretty interested in drones, for example.
As you point out, the predominant image of the NSA headquarters has been one supplied by the agency, showing a full parking lot and a mirrored-glass, apparently unremarkable office building. What can a photograph show us, when it comes to such a building?
“Photographs help us learn how to see.”
Photographs don’t “reveal” much at all but instead help us generate a kind of visual vocabulary that we can use to make sense of the world, and direct our attention to certain things around us. In other words, they help us learn how to see.
Much of your work has a blurred, impressionistic quality, the look of something half-glimpsed from a distance. The most recent photos have a much clearer, perhaps “documentary” look. What made you choose that approach? And why shoot at night?
Most of my images of “black” sites are shot from great distances using telescopes and other high powered optical systems. With those images, the blurriness comes from the heat, haze, and atmospheric distortions that occur when looking at something so far away. I always intended the new NSA, NRO, and NGA photos to go into the public domain (which is the point of the project) and I wanted them to be a little more “usable” in different contexts. I didn’t want them to have as strong an aesthetic “signature” as my other works.
“The NGA in particular looked at night like some kind of bioluminescent jellyfish in the deep sea.”
Thinking about how to shoot the buildings was a real challenge because they are really boring corporate buildings. I was thinking a lot about the NSA building and had remembered some things James Bamford had written about the size of its parking lot. I was thinking about the parking lot in relation to the black-glass building architecture and realized that, at night, the parking lot would be brightly lit up and the building itself would form a kind of negative space in relation to that light. That seemed like a nice little analogy for what the NSA does, so I tried to shoot it that way. Similar things happened with the NRO and NGA. The NGA in particular looked at night like some kind of bioluminescent jellyfish in the deep sea. I thought that was interesting as well.
What do you see when you look at these photos?
I don’t really see anything at all — they’re just pretty standard office park-type buildings. But when I see the images, I’m reminded to think about the existence of the secret state, and I’m reminded to think about how its existence impacts society at large.
Photos courtesy CreativeTimeReports and Creative Time
]]>At midnight on February 13th, 2014, a Wikipedia user named Lightningawesome added to the list of My Little Pony: Friendship is Magic characters a lengthy biography of Lightning Dash, a capricious, lovable filly existing only in fan fiction. Around that time, an unnamed user defaced the Love Holy Trinity Blessed Mission page, writing, “The LHTBM is nothing but a sect that ruins peoples lives!!!†Four minutes later, someone changed the title of Battlefield 4 to “Kentucky Friend [sic] Chicken and a Pizza Hut.†Three minutes after that, the Horrible Histories page had scrawled across it a dire warning: “You need to get off wikipedia or you will DIEEEE.â€
Wikipedia is the encyclopedia “anyone can edit,†and as of this writing it’s had nearly 700 million edits — not all of them well-meaning. Sometimes the mischief is directed, as when The Oatmeal encouraged readers to include Thomas Edison under possible references for “douchebag,†or when Stephen Colbert sends his viewers out to alter “Wikiality†by, say, “proving,†that Warren G. Harding’s middle initial stands for “gangsta.†Mostly, though, it’s predictably uninteresting — shout-outs, profane opinions, keyboard-mashed gibberish — happening thousands of times a day over more than 4 million articles.
But you’ll likely never see any of it. Within minutes if not seconds, bad edits are “reverted,†banished to a seldom-seen revision history. As Wikipedia has grown in size and complexity, so has the task of quality control; today that responsibility falls to a cadre of cleverly programmed robots and “cyborgs†— software-assisted volunteers who spend hours patrolling recent edits. Beneath its calm exterior, Wikipedia is a battlezone, and these are its front lines.
Wikipedia launched in 2001 from the ashes of expert-penned Nupedia. When Nupedia floundered, founders Jimmy Wales and Larry Sanger pivoted to a crowdsourced encyclopedia. Within four years, the English Wikipedia had more than 750,000 articles. No longer an obscure internet experiment, it had gone mainstream.
The increased attention brought a flood of new users with all of the attendant headaches: self-promotion, amateurish additions, and outright vandalism. Wikipedia’s shortcomings, both as an information source and as a self-organizing community, were becoming apparent. In the fall of 2006, Jimmy Wales gave a keynote speech calling on Wikipedians to focus on article quality over article quantity. The site apparently responded. Over the next several months, the rate of new articles created slowed, while the cull of unworthy articles increased. Wikipedia was discovering how to manage itself.
Around the same time, it faced what was probably the first example of ongoing malicious edits. Someone began blanking pages and replacing them with an image of Squidward Tentacles, the SpongeBob Squarepants character. Using open proxies, multiple user accounts, and possibly a bot, the Squidward Vandal bedeviled Wikipedians, at one point bragging via email, “I am a computer programmer and I know all the codes in the world.” He or she also claimed to be a new editor who’d gone rogue after being accused of sabotage.
“When I look at these tools, I really think that they saved Wikipedia from a sad defeat at the hands of random people.”
In response, four Wikipedians built what would become known as AntiVandalBot. As the name suggests, it was a first attempt at automated vandalism protection: using a relatively simple set of rules, it monitored recent edits and intervened accordingly. Obvious vandalism could be removed automatically, while borderline cases went to another program, VandalProof, for human intervention. Crude by today’s standards, AntiVandalBot nonetheless saved editors time and attention.
It may even have saved the site. One study examined the probability that a typical Wikipedia visit between 2003 and 2006 showed a damaged article. While the chance was always minuscule — measured in thousandths — it had increased exponentially over just three years. Without the evolving anti-vandalism tools, that trend could have continued; editors would simply be overwhelmed by defacers. “When I look at these tools, I really think that they saved Wikipedia from a sad defeat at the hands of random people,” says Aaron Halfaker, a PhD candidate and researcher working for the Wikimedia Foundation. By June 2006, anti-vandalism bots were widespread. (The Squidward Vandal was bested ultimately not by bots, but by sleuthy editors; similar vandalism has periodically reappeared.)
In 2007 Jacobi Carter, then a high school student, looked at MartinBot, then the latest evolution of AntiVandalBot. He saw too many false positives (benign edits being reverted as vandalism) and too much real damage slipping through. He decided he could improve on it, coding a bot that would score edits based on rules about profanity, grammatical correctness, personal attacks, and so on. Vandals often removed a lot of information or blanked pages completely; long-time editors were rarely vandals. By combining all of these rules, Carter’s program, Cluebot, became very effective. In the first two months of service it corrected over 21,000 instances of vandalism. It ran almost continuously for the next three years.
By late 2010, though, Carter was ready to work on the next generation, appropriately titled Cluebot NG. Basic heuristics had served the original bot well, testifying to the predictability of most Wikipedia vandals. But the rules caught only the most obvious vandalism, and there was plenty of room for improvement. Carter and his friend (and friendly rival) Chris Breneman began working on a totally revamped Cluebot.
The original bot relied on simple heuristics; Cluebot NG would instead employ machine learning. That meant instead of supplying basic rules and letting the software execute them, Carter and Breneman would provide a long list of edits classified as either constructive or vandalism — the same process is often used in spam filtering and intrusion detection. The key to successful machine learning is a large collection of data. Luckily, an anti-vandalism competition had already provided a dataset of about 60,000 human-categorized edits. From that, Cluebot could begin learning, finding patterns and correlations within the data.
To enable that learning, Breneman used an artificial neural network, a computational model that mimics the working of organic brains. But, says Breneman, “You can’t just throw a set of English words at a neural network and expect it to figure out a pattern.” Preprocessing is required: coding examples into numbers the program can understand. That’s also an opportunity for another kind of processing, called Bayesian classification, which in this case compares the edited words to those in the database. If “science,” for example, tends to appear in constructive edits, the probability is higher that an unclassified edit containing “science” is also high. That’s a simple example; Cluebot uses a number of Bayesian classifications, all of which are fed into the neural network. There are about 300 total inputs leading to a single output: the probability that a given edit is vandalism. Cluebot applies a final pass of filters (checking that the page hasn’t been reverted already, that a user is on a whitelist) before taking any action.
It patrols 24 / 7, can execute more than 9000 edits per minute, and never sleeps or lets its attention flag
Next to previous incarnations, Cluebot NG is effective, controllable, and reasonably adaptive. One worry for Wikipedians is a high rate of false positives, a fear that good-faith edits will be categorized as vandalism. Being unfairly chastised for vandalism, as the Squidward Vandal claimed to have been, could turn off new editors before they have a chance to understand Wikipedia’s myriad and Byzantine rules. Cluebot allows its administrator to set the rate of false positives, though that rate can never effectively be zero. “Yes, it does get false positives,” says Breneman, “but it’s much better than any previous bot.”
It patrols 24 / 7, never sleeping or letting its attention flag. It can execute more than 9,000 edits per minute, though it never has to approach that limit. Since 2010 it’s run almost constantly, rolling back thousands of bad edits a day; in early 2013 it topped 2 million edits. One study showed that when Cluebot NG was not operating, the time to revert vandalism nearly doubled. Malicious edits were still found, by humans, but it took almost twice as long.
That’s what Cluebot does: like all bots, it makes work more efficient. But one Slashdotter questioned whether bots fit the fundamental ethos of Wikipedia as a community-edited project. After arguing that vandalism is a subjective judgment not reducible to mathematical formulae, beakerMeep wrote, “Editing bots are wrong for Wikipedia, and if they allow it they are letting go of their vision of community participation in favor of the visions (or delusions) of grand technological solutions.” Yet from a practical point of view, it’s hard to imagine today’s Wikipedia surviving without bots.
Of course, there are some vandals that only a human can catch.
Racing to revert vandalism is fun, but “you want to take a second to consider that you’re not crushing somebody.”
Early on the morning of February 7th, 2014, a Wikipedia user known only by IP address changed the page for Date Night, the Steve Carell and Tina Fey movie. At the bottom of the cast list, he or she added “Brittany Taya as Art.” Just a few minutes earlier, the same IP address had added “Rachel McAdams as Natasha Henstridge (uncredited)” to the cast list for the parody Date Movie. The same IP address was linked to similar changes on over a dozen movies — sneaky changes, tiny bits of misinformation inserted where few would likely notice them. Dozens of edits, spanning months, originated from a range of related IP addresses. Always with the same MO: false additions to cast lists. Seeing the changes is like watching a termite chew through Wikipedia’s carefully built edifice of reliability.
Cluebot didn’t recognize these insidious, inexplicable changes as vandalism. That task fell to a human, a long-time Wikipedia patroller who goes by the name SeaPhoto. (Citing problems with angry vandals, including a death threat from an Australian student who later apologized, he asked only to be identified by username.) SeaPhoto has over 55,000 edits, most of them either fixing vandalism or chastising vandals. He often patrols while watching TV, one eye on the recent edits scrolling by on the screen. Cast-list vandal aside, it usually doesn’t take much attention, so it’s perfect for multitasking. “No patrolling during Breaking Bad or Game of Thrones,” though, he writes with a LOL.
SeaPhoto uses a program called Huggle, one of several add-ons that provides an easy interface for reviewing recent edits. That makes him, in the taxonomy of one article on Wikipedia vandalism, a “cyborg” — not a fully automated robot, but not a human manually reverting edits, either. He came to the site in 2006 looking for information about model ships, one of his hobbies. Wikipedia had no information on the topic, and he learned the hard way about the rules of editing. But, he says, “You either accept them or you don’t continue with the project.”
He’s committed to Wikipedia’s five pillars, the site’s defining principles, one of which says, “Editors should treat each other with respect and civility” and should always assume good faith on the part of fellow contributors. Wikipedia is both a product — the free encyclopedia — and a collection of dynamic social processes, containing millions of interactions among its members, nearly all of whom will never meet in real life. Without the crowd, Wikipedia stagnates. Participation in the site peaked in 2007; research suggests the rate of new editors slowed. There are several possible explanations for that, from the site’s clunky editing interface to its often impenetrable jargon to long-time editors shutting out new (but inexperienced) users. It’s the last that SeaPhoto worries about the most. Racing to revert vandalism is fun, even when you’re likely to be beaten by a bot, but “you want to take a second to consider that you’re not crushing somebody.”
How does automation affect the social interactions among Wikipedians? That’s the question Aaron Halfaker, the Wikimedia Foundation researcher, has been asking. Looking at anti-vandalism software such as Huggle and Cluebot, he says, “I see this amazing thing: it makes Wikipedia tractable.” The long-conventional view of the site as a free-for-all palimpsest of anonymous scribblings — “anyone can edit” — becomes something much different. The tools that saved Wikipedia also altered it by adding a layer of gatekeepers.
Halfaker has examined how such gatekeepers affect new contributors. “When you show up at the edge of a community and you’re there to help, you expect your interactions will be with someone who at least has time to say hello,” he says. “These tools aren’t really designed to do that. They’re designed to be efficient. They’re designed to do a job.” They’re saving Wikipedia from vandalism, but doing nothing to welcome new users.
The tools that saved Wikipedia also altered it by adding a layer of gatekeepers
How could the gatekeepers be made less imposing? Halfaker and other researchers began experimenting. First they changed Cluebot’s messages to vandals; that revealed that nicer messages actually stop vandalism quicker. That suggested new Wikipedians valued a sense of human-to-human interaction, but the problem was larger than that. Wondering if he could somehow bring one-to-one interactions to the businesslike, efficient world of vandalism prevention, Halfaker began developing what he called Snuggle.
Snuggle was designed to offer a more nuanced view of vandalism. Halfaker offers the example of an Egyptian soccer player who goes by his last name, Homos. Seen in isolation, his name would often be quickly dismissed as crude vandalism. But coming from an editor with plenty of experience on soccer articles, it would be perfectly reasonable. Snuggle was designed to provide this missing context; to show more about the person behind potential vandalism — to “give a clear picture of the whole person, rather than just one action,” as Halfaker puts it.
Cluebot efficiently removes the most egregious types of vandalism. But tools like Huggle offer users more ambiguous examples of potential vandalism, then provide little in the way of nuanced response. Halfaker sees that as a problem for the social aspect of Wikipedia: he points to the 2007 peak and notes that new contributions haven’t necessarily gotten worse. People are just as likely today to botch up their first edit. And Wikipedia has never been, from a user-experience standpoint, incredibly welcoming. But encouraging vandalism-fighters while alienating new users does Wikipedia a disservice in the long run. “These design decisions had consequences that no one could have known about,” Halfaker says.
Part of what Halfaker’s trying to emphasize is that Wikipedia is not just a battlezone: it’s not simply barbarian hordes throwing themselves against the gates. It’s also a place of collaboration among strangers, with all of the complex social interactions that entails. He’s found, for example, that not everyone wants to use Snuggle, because it doesn’t fit into their already-established means for stopping vandalism and helping new users. People being people, they have their own often idiosyncratic way of doing things. Halfaker’s larger project, of improving “newcomer socialization” on Wikipedia, involves devising better ways for novices and veterans to reach common ground.
That, of course, is what Wikipedia is founded on: finding consensus. Robots and cyborgs aside, that’s a difficult thing — one more likely to be aspired to than attained. And one that Wikipedia’s perfectly human users will keep chasing.
Illustration by Gavin Potenza
Robert Greenwald has made films for more than three decades; recently, that’s meant guerrilla documentaries on a small budget, released through his production company, Brave New Films. He’s used social media and inexpensive distribution to get his message out. His most recent film, Unmanned: America’s Drone Wars, investigates US drone policy, including testimony from people on the ground. Last October on Capitol Hill, Greenwald testified with the Rafiq Rehman family, the first Pakistani drone strike survivors to appear before Congress. In the following conversation, edited for length and clarity, he discusses why he thinks drone strikes are counterproductive, how they got to be such a major part of US policy, and why we have such a hard time talking about them.
What drew you to this topic in the first place? Did your perspective change as you worked on the documentary?
I was drawn to it because I’ve done a series of films and investigations around the war issues. I did the first film around the Iraq war and the reasons we were given for it; I did another film called Iraq for Sale about war profiteering; I went to Afghanistan and did a film challenging the military policy there. I see the idea of the bipartisan militarization of policy — the bipartisan belief that we will be safer by invading or occupying or droning — as one that is highly questionable. The drones were another example to me of a belief that there is a silver bullet. Is it counterinsurgency; is it counterterrorism — whatever is the philosophy of the moment or, in this case, the tool of the moment. It’s consistent with what I’ve been interested in, what I’ve done a series of films on.
When I did the research, it didn’t seem possible that what we were hearing was accurate. That here was this new tool, and it was only getting very dangerous people. I don’t believe in Santa Claus, I don’t believe in the Tooth Fairy, and this seemed really, really questionable. But I wasn’t sure, and I didn’t know how much damage was being done. I thought maybe, in the larger scheme of things, there is some rationale for it. The people advocating for this are not stupid people.
“I don’t believe in Santa Claus, I don’t believe in the Tooth Fairy, and this seemed really, really questionable.”
But when I interviewed people — “game-changer” is an understatement. It was an extraordinary experience to talk to person after person who clearly is innocent, who clearly has had family members killed who shouldn’t have been killed. Then to speak to experts in Pakistan: most notably Imran Khan saying to me, “Yes, there were 100, maybe 200 fanatics in the tribal area, and now you have 80,000 people who hate you. How will that make you more secure?”
I started more with questions, and then it moved to a stronger and stronger opposition. The people made it clear to me that the policy was not one that could be justified, on any level. Ultimately, none of the arguments held up for me, over the course of a little over a year of working on the film.
What are the arguments in favor of using drones this way?
The first argument was that they’d target only high-value targets. They’re not doing that. We’re seeing thousand and thousands of people in different countries who are not high-value targets. How do we know? Because whenever there is a high-value target, they announce that. But those numbers are 2 percent, 3 percent. So you can’t say this is a policy of going after high-value targets when it’s such an incidental percentage of what we’re doing.
Why is it expanding like that? Is it the philosophy, is it the CIA, is it bureaucrats taking over? We’re never going to know that, but it’s clearly gotten beyond what was initially suggested.
That’s one argument. The second argument is of an imminent threat: somebody’s going to do something now and the only way to stop him — this is partly a legal argument — is with a drone. Well, I don’t believe even the government or the CIA or the White House has articulated a single case where someone represented an imminent threat, say a person holding someone hostage or a person who has a gun and is about to shoot someone. I’ve never seen that argued; based on the information that we’re getting, it seems hard to believe we’d have that kind of situation.
“The information being given to the technically accurate drones is, over and over and over again, inaccurate information.”
Another argument is that these drones are incredibly accurate. Technically, they are. What’s the problem? The problem is the information being given to the technically accurate drones is, over and over and over again, inaccurate information. Whether it’s somebody settling a grudge because so much money is being offered for targets; whether it’s mistaken names; whether it’s military interventions trying to clean up battles that they’re having — there’s a variety of possibilities.
The main one that I heard repeatedly in Pakistan is the idea that in a very, very poor area, money is being used. We saw this policy in Guantanamo: the CIA spent a lot of money around Afghanistan, and you had a lot of people wind up in Guantanamo and in Iraq who, by the government’s own admission, were innocent. That’s a fundamental problem with the policy.
The other argument is that this is much better than sending in troops. Well, that’s not the question. Nobody in their right mind is talking about sending troops to invade Pakistan, yet we have drone strikes ongoing there. That argument sounds good, but it’s not an accurate description of the alternatives.
We’ve been using drone strikes for more than a decade, but it seems as though a sustained, serious conversation about the policy hasn’t really taken place. Do you think it will?
I think it’s a hard conversation for people to have. And they don’t want to have it for a couple of reasons. One is it’s a conversation that challenges an essential, almost religious belief that military solutions are available for the most difficult, complex problems. The drone situation suggests that’s not true.
I definitely think there was a spike in discussion around the John Brennan CIA confirmation. What we were frankly trying to do was to ignite another conversation. Hopefully we’ve been able to do a little bit of that. You never know — it’s only when you look backwards can you say, “Yeah, I think we were able to help there.”
“The Iraq and Afghanistan wars have not made us safer.”
I’m optimistic and I’m pessimistic. I’m pessimistic because the entrenched interests, both philosophical and financial, that are supportive of military solutions are extraordinary in their size and power. That makes me pessimistic. I’m optimistic because of a combination for people really knowing that with all the death and with the extraordinary, horrific human toll and with all the money spent, the Iraq and Afghanistan wars have not made us safer.
So we have that kind of foundation to build from, which we haven’t really had before. That gives me hope. These things don’t happen overnight, but sometimes with a film if you can get people feeling something, you can get them thinking something, and then you can get them taking action.
Image credit: Brave New Films
]]>Most nights, Shaun Boyd leaves his wife on the couch, contentedly cross-stitching in front of Downton Abbey or old episodes of Star Trek: The Next Generation. It’s seven or eight, after they’ve eaten dinner, when Shaun excuses himself. He goes to the next room: his room, small, with a computer desk along the nearest wall and a shelf full of Stephen King novels. A thick curtain covers the windows. He fills a glass of water. He shuts the door and turns out the lights. He sits down on a barstool and leans forward, his face painted by the lambent orange and the cathode blue of his carefully restored Donkey Kong arcade cabinet. Onscreen, the great ape climbs his ladders and starts to throw barrels. The game begins.
Shaun has spent much of his last three years sitting before the machine. On bad days, he might leave in less than an hour, tired and frustrated, with a sense of some ineffable randomness working against him. On a good day, like Monday, May 21st, 2012, he could spend three hours: that’s the day he pushed Donkey Kong to its limit — and perhaps his own. For the first time, he reached the “kill screen,” where a glitch ends the game. His score, 1,037,500 points, put him in fifth place in the Donkey Kong world record books. It took him almost two years and more than 1,000 games to get there.
He’s never done it again. As young upstarts and wily veterans have slowly pushed record scores higher, he’s watched his ranking fall to 12th among arcade players. He’s labored in darkness day after day, pitted himself against Kong and legions of falling barrels, deadly springs, and scorching fireballs. His reward has been hours of disappointment. A sane person might ask why. Why devote so much time to what is, after all, a game — one built 30 years ago for the sole purpose of parting players and their quarters?
Shaun’s answer is more a description than an explanation. As he starts another game, he says, “This is the story of my life: restarting the game over and over again, trying to get the luck to play out in your favor. It’s kind of like beating your head against the wall until it feels good.” He laughs. A little. Later, he admits with a smile, “I think I’m addicted.”
Addicted he might be, but he’s not going to stop any time soon. In the world of Kong, he feels he’s a dark horse, underestimated because he’s quiet and doesn’t show off. Last year, his million-point game earned him a spot at the Kong Off, an annual tournament of the world’s best players. He finished last. Since then he’s dropped in the rankings, but he still believes he’s got a world-beating game somewhere inside him. Beneath his calm, reserved demeanor lies a competitor.
Shaun Boyd has something to prove. So he takes an early flight out of the Detroit Metro Airport, headed for this year’s Kong Off in Denver, Colorado, where 22 players will spend two days battling for the championship belt. “I want to prove to the community that I’m not just a lucky player that ended up in the top rankings because of a lucky game,” he says. “I want to demonstrate that I can do it again.”
A world-record score demands capitalizing on the one thing you can’t control: luck
Even at 11AM on a Saturday, it’s basement dark in the 1Up bar and arcade, a below-ground, cultivated-dive establishment in Denver’s hip LoDo neighborhood. Coors Field is a half-block away; the nearby warehouses have been transformed into pricey lofts. Inside, the bartenders are friendly and casually tattooed. A Nintendo sign hangs near the ceiling and a Centipede mural covers a back wall. “Hidey ho!” yells a pinball machine in Mr. Hankey’s signature voice. Another plays the Indiana Jones theme while nearby the Crypt Keeper titters. A poster on the wall advertises a pinball tournament on the first Sunday of every month.
Across the bar wait the Kong machines, 22 of them, all outfitted with a customized “Kong Off 3” marquee. The top 12 players, as verified by official record-keeper Twin Galaxies, have dedicated cabinets for the weekend. (Wild card players, who’ve qualified once or simply walked in from the streets, share the remaining cabinets.) The games are now more than 30 years old; each has its own unique quirks and failings, which keep an on-site repairman busy.
After careful testing, most of the top 12 have claimed their machines. One blue card reads, “Hank” — that’s Hank Chien, the New York plastic surgeon known as Doctor Kong who currently holds the world record of 1,138,600 points. Farther down the row is a machine for Vincent Lemay, a Canadian bodybuilder and motormouth and Chien’s long-standing rival. Third in the rankings, his online avatar is a crossed circle stamped over Chien’s face. His signature reads, “If you can’t pull a Vincent Lemay when the pressure is on … then you’re definitely not good enough.” Hank’s sig, in turn, reads, “World Record for most insults to Vincent.”
This half-jesting bravado permeates the community of competitive Donkey Kong — a community that likely wouldn’t exist without The King of Kong: A Fistful of Quarters, the 2007 documentary that pitted two grown men against each other for the world record. It told a classic underdog story: Steve Wiebe was the humble family man just looking for a shot at the champ. The champ, Billy Mitchell, was the arrogant, mulleted alpha dog with no patience for challengers. (It’s almost too perfect that he refers to himself in the third person.) The film became a cult hit, making minor celebrities of its stars and, more importantly, bringing a new generation of players to competitive Kong.
Even today, Wiebe and Mitchell still rank among the top 12. They show up Saturday morning during the pre-tournament mill-about and their appearance shifts the social gravity in the room: the next-generation Kongers slowly, imperceptibly, begin to gather around them. There’s a lot of picture taking and autograph seeking, along with keep-it-cool handshakes and small talk.
Wiebe has the amiable mien of a retired pro quarterback who’s found another life; he appears comfortable with himself and his accomplishments, but content to consider them in the past tense. A fan asks about The King of Song, Wiebe’s debut CD. Is there a sequel in the works? Actually he’s working on a third album. “That’s how I’d rather spend my time than playing video games,” he says. Four young women arrive wearing blue T-shirts reading “Team Wiebe,” and it’s hard to tell what the man himself thinks about this. While nothing but gracious and accommodating of the fans, he also seems a little perplexed by his minor celebrity. Later, he says of a retired player: “He grew up.” Someone in the crowd chimes in, “We’ll all grow up.”
If Steve Wiebe wears his celebrity like a fondly remembered old coat that’s now a couple sizes too small, Billy Mitchell wears his like a suit of armor. Cast as the heel in King of Kong, he arrives in his competition uniform: a dark jacket and American-flag tie, a carefully cropped beard, and a thick brow rising to a sculpted brown mullet. (His hair has its own Facebook page.) As the tournament begins, the players gather outside in a small brick-walled patio. The MC introduces each of them; they get to make an entrance, slapping hands with spectators before sitting down for what’ll be 9-10 hours of Kong.
For maximum drama, Mitchell’s introduced last. Just before he’s called, he leans down to warn a reporter: “Watch out, I’m going to knock over these Jenga blocks” — beveled two-by-fours stacked high on a pair of outdoor tables. The MC welcomes “Billy Mitchell!” and the man rears back and kicks over first one table, then the other, producing sound and fury for an audience of roughly three people.
Once inside, he doesn’t appear too interested in competing. He’s satisfied to play a game or two, suffer some problems with his machine, then spend his time mingling with the audience and looming over other players. He offers complimentary bottles of Rickey’s World Famous Hot Sauces, produced by his Florida restaurant. He smiles and mugs for the cameras, hamming it up. If you’ve seen the 1983 Life magazine photo of Mitchell sporting a wispy teenage mustache and what looks suspiciously like a hickey, you can’t help but overlay that image onto his current 48-year-old self.
Billy Mitchell practically dared Shaun Boyd to take on Donkey Kong. In King of Kong, he said, “Donkey Kong, without question, is the hardest game.” Shaun didn’t believe it. He’d always given that honor to Battletoads, released on the NES when he was nine. A friend rented it, only to find no one could make it past the third stage. Then Shaun tried. Soon the neighborhood kids were gathered around to watch him play. They formed an assembly line: every time he died, they’d swap out his sweaty controller and replace it with a new one. “I didn’t beat the game that day,” he says, “but I made a lot of friends.” Being good at the game brought him attention, but it was a source of satisfaction in itself, too. It was difficult — really difficult. With patience and determination, though, he could master it.
He took Mitchell’s claim as a personal challenge. Donkey Kong had arrived in the US the year before he was born, and he’d never paid it much attention beyond a few brushes with ported versions. “I thought, ‘This game can’t be that hard,'” he says. “I was wrong. I was really wrong.” It is hard. And no matter how skilled you are, a world-record score demands capitalizing on the one thing you can’t control: Luck. Randomness. Chance. “But I think that’s the enjoyment of it,” Shaun says, “trying to beat the odds.”
Luckily, he’s not alone. When Billy Mitchell set his world record back in 1982, there didn’t yet exist a community of Donkey Kong strategists. Even in the mid-2000s, Steve Wiebe had to make his world-record run without much guidance or support. Today, though, in the wake of King of Kong, retro-gaming sites have dedicated boards for sharing arcana: the Donkey Kong Forum has almost 300 members offering tips and tricks, and the Donkey Kong Blog covers the games with ESPN-like diligence. Twitch makes it easy to stream games online, while the arcade emulator MAME enables players who don’t want to drop a few hundred dollars on an arcade cabinet. (Dean Saglio, current MAME world-record holder, plays on an aging Windows XP machine.) The game code has been dissected, its mysteries revealed. Little remains unknown about Kong, and that’s changed the game.
On the boards Shaun met Mike Groesbeck, who’d also just gotten into Donkey Kong after taking a break from some serious poker playing. They lived less than 30 minutes from one another in the Detroit suburbs and quickly bonded over their new obsession. Mike played his way into the top 12, but got bumped out just before the Kong Off. He thought he’d have to settle for a wild card, until another player dropped out.
The two travel to Denver together and on Saturday morning wait outside the 1Up for their introductions. Mike’s goes off without a hitch; he slaps high-fives with the crowd and sits down on his stool. The MC describes Shaun as being from Chicago. There’s a brief discussion. Detroit, no, he’s from Detroit. He’s from Detroit, and the MC introduces him as “Babyface Boyd” — a nom de guerre that, while accurate, is not exactly intimidating.
To the opening strains of Talking Heads’ “Burning Down the House,” the games begin.
The length of a world-record Donkey Kong game — about three hours — leaves spectators plenty of time to do other things. Like ordering beer and, as with any place where men gather to play games, offering running commentary on the action. There’s not much to be said about the gameplay itself. To the casual eye it’s something less than poetry in motion. Watching the game is not playing the game, so spectators spend their time in a kind of parallel conversation: if the player’s average score per screen is this, and if he can capitalize on his deaths… much of which is rendered moot by a single errant barrel. “I gotta do a lot of practicing,” comes a murmur from the crowd after a particularly deft onscreen move.
By the end of the day, nearly 10 hours later, Kong Off defending champion Jeff Willms leads with 1,096,200 points. Willms is a math and computer science student from Waterloo, Ontario; a long-time chess player, he turned his attention to Kong just a month before reaching his first kill screen, a milestone Shaun took almost two years to reach. “He doesn’t say much, but he’s a machine,” Shaun says. The machine has achieved a monster score, frighteningly close to the world record. It sets a blistering pace for the competitors, only three of whom have ever scored higher.
Shaun’s first game ends with a death at 639,300 points. He finishes the day in 20th place. Billy Mitchell, having settled for 21st place, glides by and looks at Shaun’s score. “Nobody does well on their first game,” he says.
“It’s all of us versus the machine. I like that camaraderie.”
Day two opens slowly, as bleary-eyed players make their way to the 1Up. Shaun and Mike share breakfast at a nearby diner, hashing out the previous day’s events. Mike’s landed in 10 place with 759,600 points. Neither has broken the million-point barrier; they’re both just hoping to reach the kill screen. “The score’s high enough now that the skill level doesn’t necessarily make as much of a difference as the random elements of the game do,” Shaun says. “You don’t necessarily determine what your score is; the randomness of Donkey Kong will.”
By 11:30AM they’re on their stools, hoping for randomness in their favor. Steve Wiebe quickly breaks a million points, nabbing third place. Jeff Willms and Hank Chien retain first and second. Shaun struggles to get a game going. Luck isn’t with him.
In the world of Donkey Kong, “luck” is a weighty notion, constantly evoked and, almost in the same breath, subtly disavowed. When Shaun admits to a lucky game, he admits the randomness of a world in which two players executing the same game can have wildly different scores. For example, smashing a barrel might yield 800 points; it might yield 300 points. This is beyond the player’s control. But the player is supposed to be in control; that’s the ultimate point of mastering a game. And Donkey Kong has been mastered, excepting those bits of irreducible randomness. Shaun believes the elite players have reached the same skill level. This means even the best players have to admit the role of luck without discounting their own skill. The winning strategy, then, boils down to playing as many games as you can, hoping to be prepared for, as Mike puts it, “good randomness.” You would want to be careful about reading this as a metaphor for life.
As Kong has given up its mysteries, its status as a game has changed. King of Kong focused on two men duking it out through a video game. Since then, says Shaun, “We’ve kind of solved all the methods for earning points. It’s now not player-vs-player, necessarily. It’s all of us versus the machine. I like that camaraderie.”
That desire for community brought Shaun to the Kong Off, where day two passes quickly. The MC calls “last quarter” and Shaun begins, still hoping to improve over his first, best game. It ends the same way every game does: a spinning Mario falls dead, followed by the words “Game Over.” Score: 415,700.
Two seats to his left, Ross Benziger, who sat out most of the first day due to illness, is vaulting from 22nd to second place with 1,067,100 points. Jeff Willms wins the Kong Off for a consecutive year.
Shaun steps away from his machine, crosses the metal barrier separating players from spectators. “I was imagining in my mind what I’d say if I won,” he says, smiling but not dry-eyed. He pauses, smiles again, as though reimagining the moment. “Something along the lines of, ‘Surprised? Me too!” And then he laughs again.
Mike is among the last players. He rides his final quarter to the kill screen and ends with 1,020,700 points, good enough for eighth place. Shaun stands behind him until the end, cheering his heart out.
“I think the building is powered by the death of dreams.”
Most nights, Shaun Boyd steps into a spartan room, closes the door on the rest of his life, and plays Donkey Kong in the dark. Him and the machine, alone. On the wall hangs a framed present from his wife: a cross-stitched Kong screen. At the bottom, the great ape lies upside down, vanquished. The score reads 874,300 in homage to Billy Mitchell’s earliest world record. Mario and Pauline, his princess, stand reunited under a pink, pixelated heart — a Keatsian moment before the next challenge begins.
There’s a cork board on the wall, too, where Shaun tacks slips of paper, quickly jotted ideas that come to him just before he falls asleep. They’re ideas for stories, articles, blog posts, even a novel he might one day write. Once, while working soul-crushing cubicle jobs, he imagined a man similar to himself. He scribbled that man’s thoughts on a piece of paper. “I think the building is powered by the death of dreams,” it reads.
“You gotta be a little crazy to want to take the Donkey Kong world record,” Shaun says. He looks at the time he’s spent, at his expanding waistline, and at the things he didn’t do instead — learning to speak Spanish or play the piano; building a killer iPhone app — and how little he has to show for it. He’s caught between believing he’s wasted his time on something trivial and believing if not Donkey Kong, he would have spent his time on something equally trivial.
He’s still weighing his skill against the game’s randomness. “All it would take is one really good game, but playing all of the unfortunate games where it didn’t work out before that — do you really want to commit that amount of time?” he asks. “Some people do.” And, at least for now, he really does.
To Tom Standage, “social media” is nothing new. Twitter and Facebook, he argues in his latest book, Writing on the Wall: Social Media – The First 2,000 Years, are simply the newest twists on an old form. People have always shared gossip and information in highly personal ways, from the Romans who scrawled quips to one another on the walls of Pompeii; to the courtiers of Tudor England, whose intrigues filled the pages of manuscript books passed hand-to-hand; to the coffeehouse intellectuals throughout Europe, who gathered together at tables piled high with the day’s news. Far from being a novelty, Standage points out, social media has always been with us.
The central premise of the book is that from Cicero to Thomas Paine to Mark Zuckerberg, people have always communicated in very personal ways. Yet we often hear people talking about “social media” as an entirely new phenomenon. Why is it so easy for people to forget this history?
“The mass-media era that is now coming to an end was a historical anomaly.”
I think it’s because people alive today have grown up in the era of mass media, so we tend to assume that this is how media technology has always worked: in a centralized, vertical, one-way, broadcast manner. But it hasn’t. The way newspapers, radio, and TV worked during the 20th century turns out to have been a consequence of the short-term high cost of equipment that could reach large audiences efficiently: steam presses, radio transmitters, and so on. If you look back before the era of this “old media,” as I do in my book, you see information traveling in a decentralized, horizontal, two-way, conversational manner, as people passed information along social connections. It is, in other words, social media, and the mass-media era that is now coming to an end was a historical anomaly. So you can see why we’ve forgotten about this previous era of ancient social media, and that’s why I’m so keen to remind everyone about it, and to take this much longer view of the history of media.
One big difference seems to be that today’s “social media” is used synonymously with Facebook, Twitter, and Google. While providing a medium for information distribution, they’re also large corporations that have to (eventually) make a profit. How does that change our understanding of their place in social-media history?
Well, coffee houses were also profit-making businesses, and so were local printers, and the postal service. So there have been commercial enterprises involved in social-media systems in the past. What’s striking about today’s social-media environment is that we have these platforms that allow decentralized sharing of information, but there are a few really big ones, which means there’s a high degree of concentration of control and ownership. When Romans exchanged papyrus rolls, or pamphlets passed between coffee houses, there wasn’t this level of concentration. But I wonder whether this state of affairs is here to stay. If you look at the 1990s, it seemed that CompuServe and AOL had an unbreakable grip on consumer internet access. It turned out that they didn’t, and those proprietary walled gardens gave way to the open web. Both email and web publishing operate on open, distributed standards that allow you to set up and plug in your own servers if you want to, so it seems anomalous that social media and social networking don’t work that way too. So far attempts to build open, distributed social platforms haven’t got very far, but I think they’re worth watching.
You note that whatever the environment, humans seem “wired” for sharing. What does that tell us about the changing faces of social media?
“Technologies come and go, but they still press the same buttons in our stone-age brains.”
What it says to me is that technologies come and go, but they still press the same buttons in our Stone-Age brains. Modern social media is so compelling because it’s the most convenient and efficient means we have invented so far to scratch a prehistoric itch: the desire to share and network with other people. Previous incarnations of social media were popular for the same reason. They just didn’t work as quickly.
Even if sharing’s innately human, authorities have consistently tried to regulate social media — with varying degrees of success. Yet today many of us would assume that not only should social media not be regulated, but that it can’t be regulated. How did that shift in thinking come about?
The difficulty of trying to regulate printing presses became apparent in the 16th century, when we see all kinds of familiar-looking ruses being exploited by printers: giving false names and addresses on title pages, for example. It was clear that watertight regulation of the press was impossible; it couldn’t be done. The idea that it shouldn’t be done arises in the 1640s in England, when the press controls that did exist broke down altogether during the English Civil War. That’s when John Milton and others made the case for freedom of the press, and freedom of expression more generally, on the basis that no system of pre-licensing or censorship would ever be fair or unbiased, so it was better to just let people print whatever they want and let their views slug it out on the battlefield of ideas. “Let truth and falsehood grapple,” as Milton put it in Areopagitica. His words seem strikingly modern today, and his arguments feel very familiar, because they are the foundations on which our conception of freedom of expression is built.
You’ve written a book examining the first 2,000 years of social media. Care to speculate on where it goes in the next few years (or few months)?
Going back to the question of centralization, I think the big question is whether these efforts to build open, distributed social platforms go anywhere. At one end of the spectrum is the scenario that the existing platforms get bigger and more powerful, and eventually run into antitrust problems. At the other end is the possibility that one of these open networks starts to gain traction, initially among geeks, and then goes mainstream following a big security or privacy breach at one of the established platforms.
“I think the big question is whether these efforts to build open, distributed social platforms go anywhere.”
The most likely outcome is in the middle, which is that new social platforms continue to rise and fall, and that competition between platforms keeps them reasonably honest. Most people already use multiple social platforms, so I suspect the future is one of more diversity rather than less. But the fundamental desire to share stuff with your friends, and to use that sharing as a means of determining and maintaining your position within your social networks will be unchanged, as it has been since Roman times.
]]>Nate Anderson’s The Internet Police: How Crime Went Online, and the Cops Followed is really a story about how the internet grew up. It begins with the story of Sealand, a refurbished wartime platform located just off the coast of Great Britain; in the early 2000s, it became home to HavenCo, a hosting service that promised complete immunity from the law. HavenCo was based on the dream of an internet unfettered by old, conventional rules — a dream quickly dashed on the shores of reality. With a few exceptions, online crime has come to be prosecuted like any other crime. Anderson talked to us about how that happened, why all cops are now “internet police,” and whether law enforcement really “gets” the internet.
You’ve framed the book partly as a battle between two camps: the exceptionalists, including John Perry Barlow, whose “A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace” imagined the internet as transcending geography and politics, a space subject only to its own law; and the non-exceptionalists who believe that crime on the internet should be subject to the same laws and norms as anywhere else in human society. Throughout the book you demonstrate the consequences of those opposed beliefs. The battle doesn’t seem to be over, but which side is “winning”? And why does the question matter?
The non-exceptionalists have won in most respects, which is why every country still has national laws and tries to enforce them — often with success — online. One of the things that I think wasn’t anticipated in the 1990s was the ease with which blocking could be done at internet scale. Instead, the idea had been that there would be so many connections into a country like China that someone hosting an offshore server couldn’t be stopped. But of course they can — and are. One only has to look at Google’s interaction with China to see that 1) technical and 2) political / legal / economic power can combine to shape the net in dramatic ways.
One chapter in the book declares “All police are internet police.” Why has that become the case, and was it inevitable?
Because so many different kinds of crime migrated so quickly onto the internet, and those crimes took place in so many places. The existing structure of local police and state and federal agencies had taken decades to create; easier to leverage the structures that were there than to create some new “internet police.” And crimes committed on the internet weren’t “new”; in almost every case, they were simply digital versions of things that cops had investigated for years offline. It was natural that, as cops ramped up their internet training, they would continue to follow cases wherever they led, even online.
“Every national agency you can think of investigates online crime.”
That’s why cops in my town troll the net looking for local prostitution, and why my county runs a unit focused on online child pornography and sex abuse, and why my state runs internet-focused task forces, and why every national agency you can think of (ICE, NSA, FBI, Postal Inspectors, DEA, and many more) investigate online crime. It’s instructive simply to look at the lists of units involved in major cybercrime cases today.
For instance, I’m currently investigating cops who use Craigslist to troll for men who might be open to sex with underage girls. One recent sting in northern Florida involved: the Department of Homeland Security (national); the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (state); the Sarasota, Polk, Lee, Seminole, and Hardee County Sheriff’s Offices (county); and Bradenton, Sanford, and St. Petersburg Police Departments (local).
Another point you bring up is the old saw about technology being agnostic about the uses to which human beings put it. For example, you write that regarding the anonymous routing network Tor, “the US government built a tool of use to criminals because that was the only way to make it useful to everyone else.” That particular tool allowed anonymous internet access for dissidents worldwide; it also enabled the online drug bazaar known as the Silk Road. You advocate a pragmatic approach to dealing with this “dual use” problem: there will always be sinister uses for technology, and we’ll continue to find ways to prosecute those crimes. But we should prefer to do so without crippling the technology itself. Do you think most law enforcement shares that view?
“The FBI is drafting new legislation that would require tech companies to have some way of getting past any encryption in their products.”
No, they quite clearly don’t. I can’t speak for all law enforcement, of course, (much less for “government,” which has so many conflicted views on “the internet” that it’s impossible to make general statements about what they are) but the FBI is the clear leader on most of these issues nationally, and they are upfront about the fact that they would like tech built in such a way that it doesn’t lock them out. The current concern is something they call “Going Dark,” which refers to being blinded by encryption. The FBI is currently drafting new legislation that would require tech companies to have some way of getting past any encryption in their products. In other words, you may have to build your tech with law enforcement in mind; the government won’t tell you exactly how it has to be done, but they do want it done somehow.
The Internet Police: How Crime Went Online, and the Cops Followed is available now.
For eight long years, the firefighters of Highland Park, Michigan, worked out of a warehouse. There was no red-bricked facade, no lanky Dalmatian. No freshly washed engines gleaming in the sun. No second-floor fire pole to descend in the dead of night to wailing sirens. Whatever idealized vision you have of firefighting, Highland Park is not it. Instead, picture a hulking, boxy building on the edge of an industrial park about six miles north of downtown Detroit. A small metal sign points the way, light blue with “Fire Dept” stenciled in all-caps white, the previous tenant’s name erased with spray paint. There’s a parking lot strewn with detritus (including a vagabond shopping cart) and beyond that train tracks and Interstate 75, the eight-lane highway that cuts through the heart of Detroit.
The Highland Park fire department opened nearly a century ago, in 1917, to serve the booming city. It once employed 84 firefighters; today it’s less than half that. Yet they answer, on average, 1,000 runs a year, including 150-200 structure fires. They fight car fires, respond to accidents, and answer calls about hazardous materials. They have one working ladder truck.
“We do stuff kind of old-schoolish, because that’s what we have: old-school, crap equipment,” says Scott Ziegler, a first-generation fireman who’s worked in Highland Park for four years. When he arrived, he slept in a tent; the company’s previous station had been condemned because the local government couldn’t afford repairs. It now stands empty and overgrown, roof collapsed in a spill of bricks and wood — just another abandoned building among the tens of thousands littering the area. In an almost inevitable turn, the Highland Park firefighters were called out to extinguish a fire at their own former headquarters.
Highland Park is three square miles surrounded by the city of Detroit, and shares the litany of woes affecting the area. In 1910, Henry Ford opened the world’s largest automobile manufacturing plant there, which boosted the economy and led to record population growth. Chrysler was founded there 15 years later, and the growing city became a landmark of car production.
“We’ve pulled up to stuff we just couldn’t control.”
But the population peaked in the 1940s at over 50,000 people. The car companies moved on, as did many of the inhabitants. The city’s tax base evaporated, leading to decades of financial trouble. Michigan appointed an emergency manager for the troubled municipality in 2000; that manager was fired in 2009, accused of embezzling from the city, and eventually ordered to repay $264,000. Meanwhile, two-thirds of the streetlights were removed to cut costs. Today the area is stricken with unemployment, with more than a third of its people living below the poverty line. Highland Park’s population stands at just 12,000 people.
“We’ve still got a lot of nice neighborhoods here. A lot of hard-working people. Even in some of the neighborhoods where there’s maybe only a couple of houses left, there are people who’ve lived there for 40, 50 years,” Ziegler says. Once called to the site of three burning houses, all vacant, firefighters found a neighbor who’d lived there for 46 years. He pleaded with them not to let his house burn down. “I would never in a million years say, ‘I promise you we won’t let your house burn down,’ but those are the words that came out of my mouth,” Ziegler says. But they saved the house.
People don’t understand aggressively fighting fire in abandoned buildings, Ziegler says, even other firefighters. “The reason is you’re two feet away from someone’s whole life. And if you don’t go in and do it, quickly and efficiently, you’re going to end up burning a whole block down,” he says, “And it’s happened here. We’ve pulled up to stuff we just couldn’t control.” With a short-staffed crew, limited equipment, and little help from surrounding fire companies (often equally overwhelmed, particularly in Detroit), Highland Park’s firefighters see themselves as on the front lines with every blaze. If they don’t stop it, an entire street might burn; Ziegler’s seen seven houses go up at once.
“Just because someone’s not paying their taxes doesn’t make it vacant,” says Paul Bates, who’s fought fires for 14 years. “I think we’ve found more people living in vacant houses than we have in houses that are supposed to be occupied.” One supposedly vacant house contained five children; when rescuers arrived and kicked in the door, the entire upper floor was in flames. Most of the fires in Highland Park are arsons — people burning for kicks, or for insurance money, or to clear abandoned property. But not all. Cold winters and poverty combine, resulting in accidental fires caused by squatters burning to stay warm. Or simply people trying to live as best they can behind boarded-up windows, often with no electricity, heat, or water.
“Well, just let the whole city burn down. Let the houses burn.”
“And then you get people saying, ‘Well, just let the whole city burn down. Let the houses burn,’” Ziegler says. “That’s not the answer. You can’t just let things burn down.” He began recording Highland Park’s fires with a helmet-mounted camera, then posting the videos on YouTube. He cut together a year’s worth of fires; the video soon went viral, appearing on Gawker and The Huffington Post. Asked to appear on local news, he was hesitant; he didn’t want to seem like a showboat. Instead, he wanted people to see what he and his company saw: buildings engulfed in flames, a single engine trying valiantly to quell the fire. He and another firefighter leaping out to extinguish a car fire. A pair of them going running into an inferno, nothing but smoke and flame visible before them. As obvious as it may seem, he wanted viewers to realize how difficult the job is. And how important.
In late August, the Highland Park fire department finally moved out of its temporary station, where its members had eaten in a trailer and slept in plywood barracks they’d made themselves. With federal American Recovery and Reinvestment Act funds, the city built a new fire hall directly across from the old one, still broken and charred. Firefighters were so excited with the new facility, some of them stayed over even when not on the clock. Eight years later, the new building is one thing that might make their jobs a little easier.
Jonathan Lethem makes no secret of his influences. His first published novel, Gun, with Occasional Music, riffed on the hard-boiled detective fiction of Raymond Chandler. He’s written an academic novel in the style of Don Delillo (As She Climbed Across the Table), and crossbred E.M. Forster’s A Passage to India with John Ford’s The Searchers, transporting the Western to an alien world in Girl in Landscape. He’s even written about “the ecstasy of influence,” reminding us that no creative act arrives ex nihilo — it’s all, like his own work, a product of influences and appropriations, conscious and not.
His latest novel, Dissident Gardens, follows three generations of utopian seekers whose American dreams are thwarted by reality. They’re activists to varying degrees and, as Lethem says, fundamentally uncomfortable in everyday life. Their stories trace a particular vein running through the country’s history, from the Communist cells of the 1930s to the Occupy movement of today.
By telephone from his home in California, Lethem discussed the porous borders between science fiction and “the mainstream,” how contemporary fiction acknowledges (or doesn’t) technology and capitalism, and wanting to write about his grandmother’s sex life.
Last time we talked, we discussed Philip K. Dick, a science fiction writer who had a great influence on you — not just as a writer, but as a person. You’ve mentioned early in your career wanting to align yourself with genre writers, who you called “those exiles within their own culture.” As someone well into your career, with more than a half-dozen published novels, what’s your relationship to science fiction today?
That’s a really great and really complicated, wide-open opportunity there. There are so many different angles on what it even means to speak with confidence about a science fiction genre. It’s a bit like an oasis in the desert that looks coherent from a distance, and when you get closer is not just a mirage — there’s something there — but some of it was a mirage. And certainly, there’s a lot of sand between the trees and the little trickle of water that looked like one coherent thing in the distance.
By the way, every time I laugh, you should insert [laughter], okay? I think it just makes things much better, because I’m constantly being taken for a pompous asshole when I was just trying to be funny about something. Something about my tone requires a tremendous number of [laughter], okay?
Do you want me to —
Yeah, that’s all on the record. You can say that whole thing.
So, speaking as a novelist, I feel great confidence that the hard-boiled detective story is a genre. When I read Raymond Chandler or Dashiell Hammett or Ross Macdonald or the very early James Ellroy, I see the pattern. When I wrote Gun, with Occasional Music and Motherless Brooklyn, those were genre novels: the hard-boiled detective story gave me a reliable template.
I don’t feel that way about everything. The “crime” section contains those hard-boiled detective stories, but it also contains this other genre, which is about the criminal protagonist. They’re the kinds of books you encounter in Charles Willeford and Donald Westlake. They may both be read by people who dig mysteries, but they’re different things. And they’re different things yet again from the well-ordered, English-style Agatha Christie pursuit-by-armchair-detective, sequence-of-likely-suspects-leading-to-apprehending-the-culprit-by-way-of-organized-clues that makes you go “Aha!” and “Oh ho!” That’s another genre.
But all of those things are hiding in what gets called “mysteries.” I just think “mystery” is not a genre, not in a literary sense.
And I feel that way a hundred times over about what gets called “science fiction.” Even though I’m very well versed in a lot of things that lurk underneath that label, and I’ve perpetrated some of them as a writer, and I read variously under that label, and I’ve hung out with people — a lot — who feel that they’re walking around under a meaningful umbrella called “science fiction.” To them it seems like one big, clear thing. It just doesn’t to me. It seems like a whole host of different phenomena. And some of them are literary practices, and many others are social formations. Or ideological formations.
“By the time I was good enough to have anyone pay any attention, I’d already conceived the very, very pompous ambition to write ‘literary science fiction.'”
That’s the world of science fiction that I see, so any time I talk about it, I’m forced to smash up the terminology and reinvent it, so that I can become comfortable answering your question — insert [laughter] here.
But the first thing I’ll say is that I love science fiction — I grew up reading it with none of the awareness I just described. I thought, “What a cool zone of operation. I want to be there. I want to operate that stuff myself.” Then, even as I was developing my ambition to be a writer, my appetite for other kinds of fictional play was overtaking that first impulse and complicating it.
“I liked having a cult reputation. It felt very appropriate to me.”
By the time I was good enough to have anyone pay any attention, I’d already conceived the very, very pompous ambition to write “literary science fiction.” That was the simplest thing to call it at the time. Something like that of a J.G. Ballard, let’s say, or a Thomas Disch, that demanded to be taken other ways. And specifically evoked the higher consciousness of language that’s more typically literary. I wanted to be breaking out of the genre before I even wanted to be in it. So I tried to do that, and I certainly talked about it ceaselessly to the people who were publishing me early on. Or the scattering of times I would get interviewed back when I was an apprentice writer, before I had anything except kind of a cult reputation.
Which was cool. I liked having a cult reputation. It felt very appropriate to me — for exactly the reason that you gave in quoting that remark back to me: I like marginal identities. I feel like a dissident [chuckle] inside daily life and inside literary culture and inside my identity as a citizen of the United States of America. That feeling of being eccentric, being from the periphery, working the margins — the benefits and costs of that kind of position have always seemed very much my legacy. That’s where I would be.
Which is why I end up confusing people so much, I think, and sometimes outright bugging people so much when I seem to be refusing to obediently play the role of the major novelist. I just made a really awkward quote because it didn’t have any [laughter] next to it in Salon, where I said I’m taken too seriously. [laughter] And of course it needed [laughter] not to seem obnoxious.
Because when someone who seems to other people to have all these privileges — and I do have all these privileges — scoffs at them, it’s a double insult. Not only are you top dog, but you’re pissing on those who through their regard and interest in your work have made you top dog. How dare you!
“I like that Philip K. Dick and the science fiction writers that I fell in love with were intrinsically in this termite role, nibbling around the edges of the culture.”
But the problem is: I just think there’s something really, really wrong with my privileges and really, really wrong with the way hierarchies set themselves up in the arts. So that I keep not getting to operate as a cult figure or a marginal operator — and I don’t anymore; there’s no question I don’t, right? — means that instead I have to do these perverse gestures to try to rupture what we now know to call “hegemonic authority.” Insert [laughter].
I like that Philip K. Dick and the science fiction writers that I fell in love with were intrinsically in this termite role, nibbling around the edges of the culture. I know it was uncomfortable for them, and it certainly didn’t pay as well as they might have liked, but it meant that their work had a relevance and vitality and disreputable energy that, for me as a younger reader, hands-down won over the official literary product of the same time period.
Though one of the things that’s wrong with marginal identities is that you tend to act as though the big hegemonic center is all one thing itself. “The mainstream” doesn’t agree with itself or make any kind of sense or have a coherent position, except in the very small matter of believing itself to be the only action. That’s the only thing it agrees about. [laughter] The rest of it, if you really pay any attention and care, and I started to care about all kinds of novels and all kinds of literary ventures, and possibilities — different kinds of lives that writers led — the rest of the mainstream is pretty much at one another’s throats over various matters of style and politics, minor grudges and so forth. But it looks like one big thing if you’re in exile from it.
These questions of subculture within literary practice really matter to me enormously, and I was very responsive to them because I came from a background where I took being in a subculture or being on a margin or being at a dissident position from normative constituent stuff as not only a given, but I was happy about it and wanted that to be replicated in what I did.
“It’s not only science fiction writers who have seen their job in the latter half of the 20th century as coping with technology and capitalism.”
Science fiction, in terms of its self-defined engagement with ideas like extrapolation or technology as an inevitable human encounter in the 20th century, or its rationalist bias — some of these things were really vivid and attractive to me, and they also seemed really problematic. They were things to argue with or tease at. And I did so, because the writers I liked were engaged with this material, and coming of age in the postwar 20th century, inside a late-capitalist disaster area, requires you to be interested in those things if you’re alert to anything except primal emotional experience. Some novelists try to restrict themselves to primal emotional experience, but it’s not only science fiction writers who have seen their job in the latter half of the 20th century as coping with technology and capitalism.
I was, in a very predictable way, equally excited the minute I knew people like Don Delillo and Thomas Pynchon existed. Those two are understood as literary writers because of their disposition and their remove from participation in any subcultural literary-social milieu, but by the nature of their interests could easily be science fiction writers.
In Pynchon’s case, he borrows from science fiction writers right and left. In Gravity’s Rainbow, Tyrone Slothrop’s power of knowing where the rockets are going to fall seems to derive pretty directly from Philip K. Dick’s Time Out of Joint. In his newest book, unless I’m crazy, there’s a total Alfred Bester riff about time travel.
So I don’t think there’s any important difference between science fiction and “the mainstream.” That was a really long way of saying that. [laughter]
I think your description nicely brings us to your latest novel, Dissident Gardens, the way you’ve described these dissident and marginal identities as seated in cultural artifacts, with differing degrees of overt ideology.
Comic books, for example, may not always have had an overtly subversive message, but as cultural objects they were not mainstream — not countercultural, necessarily, but marginal, sort of grimy and overlooked. So I’m interested how that contrasts with what’s going on in the new book, which covers a time in which identification with a specific, oppositional ideology — communism — was more prevalent than today. It seems a much different idea of dissidence.
Sure — so, Captain America hardly seems like a subversive figure. But there’s something about the milieu and the form and the tone and even the reading protocols of comics. They screw you up: you have to figure out this new way of inserting yourself in the space between these panels and drawings and word balloons. Where is the meaning in that space? Everything about those comic books is undermining — not to mention what you called the griminess. Though we should be careful about too much fetishizing of griminess; there’s lots that’s grimy and it’s boring.
But yeah, comic books are an eruption. They contain irrational pressure on the status quo. They seem to be begging you to see things differently. They’re uncomfortable. Where they came from is bizarre; where they’re going is bizarre.
So the new book is about people who are… putting actual political spectrums or movements aside; let’s forget left, right, center. People who are out of sorts. They’re uncomfortable in the world they’re in. They’re in helpless revolt against the position that everyday life seems to cast them in. Sometimes that’s an incredibly energizing and procreative situation. When Lenny is trying to give birth to the Sunnyside Proletarians [a professional baseball team “of, by, and for the working man”] from the sweat of his fevered brow, there’s a crazy vitality to his impossible dream. It’s a muddle of American can-do optimism, baseball-and-apple-pie wedded to this ostensible revolutionary sedition: that the country itself needs to be torn down from its foundations.
It’s hardly about a coherent ideological position so much as it’s about the feeling that your fantasy of transformation is so real that it might actually catch fire. It might catch fire in someone else’s brain; it might catch fire in the world. We all walk around with fantasies of transformation. But when they’re organized along this political–ideological axis…
People have sometimes been prone to ask me questions like the one you’re asking me about the development of my interests, but in order to use the phrase “fantastic element.” When I wrote Motherless Brooklyn, which was my first tacitly “realist” book, I would always say, “Well, actually, language is the fantastic element.” Because it runs out of control. In J.G. Ballard’s The Drowned World, you meet our world plus these floods that are tall enough to cover skyscrapers. In Motherless Brooklyn you meet our world drowning in the Tourettic language — it’s just totally running amok.
I would say in a way utopian-visionary belief is the fantastic element in Dissident Gardens. It’s this riotous element that stands for all irrational possibilities, the unnameable yearnings and despairs and pressures everywhere around us in daily life. But they’re not tangible; you can’t rap on them like a desk and prove they’re there. Yet they’re pushing on everything. In this book, that fantastical stuff is the utopian belief, given various names. Most simply, given the name “the American Communist movement,” when that was sustainable. But it’s not by the later stages of the book. Yet it’s still there. The last couple chapters are about the strange pressure of this unnameable force that’s still there.
What drew you to this particular story, to this unnameable force?
I have the blessing and the curse of total identification. I become what I’m writing, whatever it may be. I’ve always leaned toward the kind of ill-defined socialism or Kropotkin-style, accent-on-the-commune Communism. I was such a revolutionary while writing this book that when Occupy emerged I thought, “Holy shit, my book has a happy ending — the last thing I need!” [laughter] Like this would be really great for the world, but it was really going to screw me over.
No one starts with a theme; I’d certainly be horrified if I thought I did, or if people got that impression. I wanted to write a book about my grandmother’s sex life. I wanted to use these legacies of being a kid who was both embarrassed and proud to be marching around New York City all the time, in favor of daycare and against nuclear power. I was never done going to demonstrations as a kid.
“No one starts with a theme; I’d certainly be horrified if I thought I did, or if people got that impression.”
I wanted to scrape up these residues, these legacies from my grandmother’s life, which is, incidentally, quite mysterious to me. I still don’t know whether she was actually in the Communist Party. I know that she was enough of a fellow traveler that it gave cause for my uncle Fred to taunt her for the rest of her life. There was just this dark area that wasn’t being described about her life. So I decided that it was that she was a fully functioning member of a cell. But god knows it’s all guesswork.
So this stuff was there for me to think about and feel fascinated by and embarrassed by. And eventually to recognize that, “Oh, I’m thinking about lives in the way that I think about lives when I’m going to make up characters and write a book.” It was about the streets of Sunnyside. It was about the contradictions even as a child I could detect in my grandmother’s pride in her American identity and her pride as a New Yorker; that she was anti-authoritarian, but all the men in her imaginative life were presidents or mayors or beat cops. And I thought, “She kind of loves uniforms. And rank. What’s that?” [laughter] So this is where the book comes from. Not from deep thoughts. [laughter]
“Wouldn’t it be really cool to have a mind-controlled flamethrower?” ponders Matt Oehrlein. He’s perched on a solid wooden desk, dressed in a T-shirt and shorts, his sneakers crossed at the ankle and swinging in the air. He’s thin and tall, sporting thick-rimmed black glasses and a shock of bushy brown hair. Around him rises what to an outsider looks like functional chaos: a warehouse-like, fluorescent-lit workshop where a traffic light hangs from the ceiling, a forklift idles nearby, and the shrill grind of a table saw cuts through the air.
Naturally, he already does have a mind-controlled flamethrower. It’s a precarious-looking wooden frame about 3 feet tall, topped by a pair of propane tanks. After some required assembly, Oehrlein dons a Bluetooth-enabled headset, steps on a safety switch, and begins to concentrate. Soon enough, satisfyingly whooshing balls of flame illuminate the street.
This is i3 Detroit, a collaborative workspace just north of the city. You can call it a hacker space or a maker space, but fundamentally it’s a community — one made up of people who want to build and learn, using everything from lathes and saws to solder and solenoids to screen printing tools and laser cutters. It’s a nonprofit funded largely through membership dues, with members teaching one another tips and techniques. There’s a lot of teamwork, too, of the sort that produced the mind-controlled flamethrower.
“Do we really need mind-controlled flamethrowers?”
Bringing people together to build cool things while learning about technology is i3’s mission: the three i’s stand for “imagine, innovate, and inspire.” That sense of camaraderie attracted Oerhlein when he first visited two years ago. Fresh from graduate school at the University of Minnesota, he was offered a job that required moving to Detroit. “I didn’t know a lot about Detroit,” he says, “so a lot of people told me, ‘You’re going to get shot. Detroit’s a scary place. Don’t go there.’” He visited for a week and loved what he saw happening. “i3 Detroit was a big part of why I moved out here,” he says. Knowing virtually no one in the area, he threw himself into the space, spending three or four nights a week there. Today he’s the organization’s president.
“The hackerspace is one of the reasons I’d never leave here, because it’s such a community,” says Jessica Rowland. She’s lived here for five years, spending a couple nights a week at i3; after receiving a design degree from the College of Creative studies in downtown Detroit, she wanted to get away from sitting at a computer to make her art. Like Oehrlein, her first tour convinced her she wanted to join, mainly so she could get her hands on the laser cutter. Now she’s hoping to turn her acrylic lightboxes into a business, though she still appreciates the group’s less practically minded projects. “Obviously, do we really need mind-controlled flamethrowers?” she asks rhetorically. “But it’s really cool.”
Of course, similar spaces exist around the world, and the “maker movement” of dedicated DIYers seems almost ready for the mainstream. The area has several such spaces, from Eastern Market’s OmniCorpDetroit to Dearborn’s TechShop, and i3 members believe there’s something special about working in Detroit. After school, Rowland was anxious about “getting off the computer and out into my community.” She wanted to build things people could interact with, that might actually be useful. So she took on a local problem: streetlights. With the city’s budget shrinking along with its population, nearly half the street lights lacked electricity or needed repair. With some lemonade containers, PVC pipes, and solar inserts, she created makeshift lighting for the city’s historic highway, Woodward Avenue. “I think in Detroit, especially for the people who are here because we want to be, it’s very much the sense of pulling up your bootstraps,” she says. “You work with what you have.”
People build things, and i3 Detroit is about reminding them of that fact
“Work with what you have” is a key tenet of the maker ethos, but doing so means knowing what you have. Cool stuff like the mind-controlled flamethrower, as Oehrlein explains, has a nearly universal appeal. Then he can say, “This is really cool; we built it at i3 Detroit. And so can you.” A flamethrower, or a laminar flow fountain controlled by dipping your hands into glasses of water, or a Twitter-enabled scrolling sign worn to a Halloween party — these projects might inspire someone to imagine a more creative relationship to his or her environment. “People tend to look at the world differently,” Oehrlein says, once they’ve taken something apart and thought about how to make it better, or just different. They’ve been offered a new kind of power to shape their world.
“i3 Detroit gives people a place that lets them have unrestricted creativity,” he says. People build things, and i3 Detroit is about reminding them of that fact, giving them a little more power to build the world they want. That’s an important power anywhere, he believes, and maybe a little more so in a place like Detroit, which has seen its share of quick fixes and disposable solutions. Making, in the form of assembly-line manufacturing, long defined the city, and may in some form define its future. But Oehrlein resists making grand claims about the power of DIY to revive a ruined city. He and the members of i3 Detroit are content to make cool stuff, maybe to inspire, and to give people the tools they need to live out that inspiration.